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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 20021 (Sarbanes-Oxley) on fiduciary duty analysis in 
corporate law.  Sarbanes-Oxley contains several provisions that 
pointedly bear on corporate governance.2  These include, for 
example, provisions directing the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), national securities exchanges including, 
 
†  Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law 
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 †† Partner, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The positions 
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  The authors wish to thank Amy Seidel of Faegre & Benson, Larry 
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for their helpful insights and comments in the preparation of this article.   
 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of  11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 
29 U.S.C.). 
 2. See infra Part II (discussing major corporate governance provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
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importantly, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and securities 
associations (the Nasdaq) to establish standards relating to audit 
committees;3 requiring senior officers to make certifications 
pertaining to a reporting company’s disclosure controls and 
procedures and its internal controls and procedures for financial 
reporting;4 and prohibiting personal loans to officers and directors5 
and mandating forfeiture of senior officer bonuses and profits 
from securities sales in the event of an accounting restatement due 
to misconduct.6  In these areas, Sarbanes-Oxley, as federal law, 
preempts inconsistent state law.  Although not specifically addressing 
director and officer fiduciary duties, Sarbanes-Oxley will, we argue, 
only modestly preempt this area—historically governed by state 
law—but will nonetheless be highly and pervasively influential, 
even where it does not preempt. 
We develop in some detail, and for the first time,7 exactly how 
Sarbanes-Oxley may alter state fiduciary duty law.  In doing so, we 
note, as others have,8 that Sarbanes-Oxley makes unprecedented 
federal inroads into the area of corporate governance.  It does this 
through amendments to federal securities law, thereby blurring 
what was previously thought to be a clear demarcation between 
federal securities law and state corporate law.9  Although federal 
 
 3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1) (adding § 10A(m) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); infra Section 
II.A. 
 4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302, 404, and 906, 116 Stat. at 777, 789, and 806 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262, and 18 U.S.C. § 1350, respectively).  See 
infra Sections II.B.2.a and II.B.2.c. 
 5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(c), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m) (adding subsection 13(k) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  See infra 
Section II.B.1.d. 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 116 Stat. at  778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7243).  See infra Section II.B.2.b. 
 7. Others have raised or touched on this subject, and some have briefly 
suggested in a general way how Sarbanes-Oxley may alter state fiduciary duty 
analysis, but no one has developed such an analysis in depth. See, e.g., John C. 
Coffee Jr., Corporate Securities—Post-Enron Jurisprudence, N.Y.L.J. 5 7/17/2003 (col. 
1); Martha E. McGarry, Director Liability: Dawn of a New Era?  7 THE M & A LAWYER 1 
(May 2003). 
 8. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 
4/01/03 REGULATION 26 (Spring 2003); Robert B. Thompson and Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
859 (2003); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of 
Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189 (2003).  See Lawrence Cunningham, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Might Just Work),  35 CONN. 
L. REV. 915 (2003). 
 9. See Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485, 
2
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incursion into corporate governance is important in its own right, 
the more intriguing issue concerns the eventual interplay between 
federal and state law.  Specifically, on various subjects will federal 
law wholly supplant, or merely supplement, state law?  In 
addressing this question with specific regard to the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on state fiduciary duty law, we draw attention to two 
overarching features of this federal mandate as compared to state 
fiduciary duty law.  First, Sarbanes-Oxley is legislative and 
administrative in origin,10 whereas corporate fiduciary duty 
concepts, although having some statutory basis, largely derive from 
equity and are created by judges.11  Second, Sarbanes-Oxley adopts 
a rules-based approach to corporate governance, in contrast to the 
more fluid standards and duties-based approach of judicial 
fiduciary analysis under state law.  We think these two differences in 
the nature of federal and state law approaches to corporate 
governance will prove significant to understanding how Sarbanes-
Oxley will (and will not) alter judicial crafting of state law fiduciary 
duties. 
Part II identifies and elaborates on provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley most likely to raise fiduciary duty issues for corporate officers 
and directors.  These provisions include those specified above and 
certain others.   
Part III addresses state law fiduciary duties of directors and 
officers.  It first describes the three fiduciary duties applicable to 
corporate directors—due care, loyalty, and good faith.  Special 
attention is given to the obligation of good faith because recent 
judicial decisions,12  which are highlighted, as well as commentary 
by influential Delaware judges13 suggest a willingness to read that 
duty more broadly in the post-Enron era.  This is significant 
because breach of good faith, like breach of loyalty—but unlike 
breach of due care—allows the imposition of liability for money 
damages on directors.  Part III further examines several facets of 
this fluid, emerging duty, as it is likely to be a doctrinal vessel for 
injecting certain mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley into state fiduciary 
duty law.  Part III then recalls the oft-overlooked status of corporate 
 
491-502 (1991). 
 10. See infra Part II (discussing legislative, administrative agency, and self-
regulatory organization provisions). 
 11. See infra Part III (discussing state fiduciary duty concepts). 
 12. See infra notes 266-77 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. 
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officers as agents who owe fiduciary duties to the corporation as 
principal.  We describe their various fiduciary duties in that 
capacity and note critical differences between breach of fiduciary 
duty claims against officers and such claims against directors. 
Part IV assesses how the federally mandated corporate 
governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley will (and will not) change 
how state judges equitably evaluate officer and director conduct 
under traditional state fiduciary duty strictures.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
itself is silent on this question, just as it is largely silent on the ability 
of private litigants to bring a right of action.14  The federal impact 
on state fiduciary duties will, we believe, be varied, not singular.  
We identify those few specific areas where Sarbanes-Oxley 
preempts inconsistent (and weaker) state fiduciary concepts, either 
in whole or in part.  We also identify areas where the mandates of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, though lacking preemptive force, will be highly 
influential in state fiduciary duty analysis.  We conclude, however, 
that state law will remain preeminent in the fiduciary duty area.  
This is because, first, the standards-based approach of state law 
remains the lingua franca into which Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandates 
must inevitably be translated for fiduciary duty purposes.  We reject 
the view that Sarbanes-Oxley has somehow “federalized” the area of 
corporate fiduciary duty law.  To be sure, federal law now plays a 
more significant role in corporate governance.  That law, however, 
evinced no intention to displace state law concepts designed to 
accord corporations and their stockholders a remedy for director 
and officer breaches of duty.  Sarbanes-Oxley created additional 
obligations to curb and redress corporate wrongdoing; it did not 
eliminate state law notions aimed at achieving the same result.  
Federal law will likely influence the scope and content of fiduciary 
duties, but those duties will remain rooted in state law. 
Second, the equity and standards-based approach to fiduciary 
 
 14. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expressly includes rights of action for 
whistleblower retaliation, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 803 (2002) 
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A), and for insider trading during pension 
blackout periods, § 306, 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7244).  It 
also negates the implication of new private rights of action in connection with 
improper influences on audits, § 303, 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
7242), and with an extended statute of limitations for securities fraud, § 804m, 116 
Stat. at 801 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658).  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308(a)the 
“Fair Funds” provisionprovides that where a disgorgement fund has been 
created due to SEC enforcement action, civil penalties paid in the action may be 
placed in the fund to compensate victims of the violation.  116 Stat. at 784 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246). 
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duties—when coupled with the Delaware judiciary’s adjudicative 
and hortative functions—is a highly adaptive method for injecting 
change into corporate governance practices on an ongoing basis.  
It is superior to legislation and administrative regulation in this 
respect, and it affords a greater sensitivity to the important element 
of context in assessing fiduciary performance, a sensitivity lacking 
in more “universal” legislative governance reform efforts.  Finally, 
many of the specific provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley will require 
interpretation, first by corporate boards and officers and second by 
federal and state courts, in determining whether the boards and 
officers have complied with the law.  Such determinations will often 
be based on whether the directors and officers discharged their 
duty in attempting to comply with the law.  In other words, where 
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves off, state fiduciary duty analysis must take 
over.  The overall result of Sarbanes-Oxley in the corporate 
fiduciary duty area, consequently, is greater federal influence in a 
federalism arrangement still dominated by state law. 
II. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
On July 29, 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, which President Bush signed the next day.15  The impetus to 
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley is well known. A host of high-profile 
public company bankruptcies, including Enron, WorldCom, and 
Global Crossing, and a stock market that had dropped 
precipitously for the previous two years had sapped public 
confidence in the capital markets, public company boards and 
officers, and market regulators. The perceived facilitation of 
Enron’s demise by auditing firm Arthur Andersen further eroded 
public confidence. In a “do-something!” atmosphere, Congress did 
something, passing what some have called “the most important 
securities legislation since the original federal securities laws of the 
1930s.”16 
 
 15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 
29 U.S.C.). 
 16. William H. Donaldson, Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Testimony Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
(Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/_files/ donaldsn.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony]. 
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A.  General Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Sarbanes-Oxley includes six main initiatives: creating the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a private, nonprofit 
corporation that is overseen by the SEC to “oversee the audit of 
public companies that are subject to the securities laws”;17 
enhancing the independence of public company auditors;18 
regulating corporate governance and responsibility;19 enhancing 
financial disclosure;20 regulating securities analyst conflicts of 
interest;21 and adding several new substantive crimes under the 
securities laws and enhancing penalties for violations of the 
securities and other laws.22 In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley provided 
for additional funding of the SEC and enhancement of the SEC’s 
regulatory authority,23 commissioned several studies that required 
reports back to Congress,24 and contained an editorial comment on 
corporate tax returns.25 
Although many of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley will have 
profound, and no doubt unanticipated, effects on corporate law in 
the future, this article will focus only on those provisions that 
appear most likely to affect corporate governance and fiduciary 
duties.26 
 
 17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109, 116 Stat. at 750-771 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219). See S. REP. NO. 107-205 at 12 (2002) (setting forth testimony 
demonstrating the need “for a strong Board to oversee the auditors of public 
companies”). 
 18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201-209, 116 Stat. at 771-775. 
 19. Id. §§ 301-308, 116 Stat. at 775-785. 
 20. Id. §§ 401-409, 116 Stat. at 785-791. Several of the provisions in Title IV, 
however, have corporate governance implications. See generally infra section II.B. 
 21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501, 116 Stat. at 791-793 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78o-6 and 78u-2). 
 22. Id. §§ 801-906 and 1101-1107, 116 Stat. at 800-810.  Notable among these 
are sections 806 and 1107, which provide protection for employees of public 
companies who allege violations of the securities laws; and section 1105, which 
allows the SEC to prohibit any person from being an officer or director of any 
public company if such person has violated section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC finds “that person demonstrates unfitness to 
serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.”  Id. § 1105. 
 23. Id. §§ 601-604, 116 Stat. at 793-796. 
 24. Id. §§ 701-705, 116 Stat. at 797-800. 
 25. Id. § 1001, 116 Stat. at 807. “It is the sense of the Senate that the Federal 
income tax return of a corporation should be signed by the chief executive officer 
of such corporation.” Id. 
 26. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 16, at 6: 
The sweeping reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act address nearly every 
aspect and actor in our nation’s capital markets. The Act affects every 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/12
JOHNSON SIDES-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  6:53 PM 
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES  1155 
B.  Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions that Affect Fiduciary Duty 
Only one title of Sarbanes-Oxley, Title III, references 
corporate fiduciary duty issues, although it does so under the title 
of “Corporate Responsibility.”  However, several other titles have 
the effect of regulating the conduct of directors and officers of 
public companies in a manner that is akin to regulating the 
exercise of their fiduciary duties. In addition to Title III, much of 
Title IV and section 906 substantively regulate the conduct of 
officers and directors.  Two of these provisions, sections 30427 and 
906,28 were self-executing upon effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
The remaining provisions affecting corporate governance required 
additional rulemaking by the SEC, or the NYSE and Nasdaq.  In 
addition to the required rulemaking, the NYSE and the Nasdaq 
adopted several other amendments to their respective marketplace 
rules that have important effects on the corporate governance of 
listed companies.29 
The Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that affect fiduciary duties can 
be divided into provisions aimed at directors (particularly the audit 
committee)30 and provisions aimed at officers.  We will first 
examine those provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, and subsequent 
rulemaking, that affect the conduct of directors.  We will then 
examine the provisions aimed at officers. 
1.  Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, and Nasdaq Provisions Intended to 
Regulate the Conduct of Directors. 
a.  Section 301—Public Company Audit Committees 
One major theme of Congress and the SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley 
and subsequent rulemaking was a sense that public company 
 
reporting company, both domestic and foreign, as well as their officers 
and directors. The Act also affects those that play a role in ensuring the 
integrity of our capital markets, such as accounting firms, research 
analysts and attorneys. The over-arching goals of the Act are far-
reaching and include restoring investor confidence and assuring the 
integrity of our markets. 
Id. 
 27. See infra section II.B.2.b below. 
 28. See infra section II.B.2.a below. 
 29. See generally infra section II.B.1.b. 
 30. See S. REP. NO. 107-205 at 24-25 (2002).  “Many recent failures have been 
attributed to close ties between audit committee members and management.” Id. 
7
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boards of directors had abdicated their oversight responsibilities 
and that they needed more directors who were independent.  
Boards were perceived as acting more as caretakers and less as 
overseers of management.31  Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley is an 
attempt to remind directors of their role and responsibilities, and 
to foster greater director independence.32 
Section 301 amended section 10A of the Exchange Act by 
requiring the SEC, within 270 days of passage, to have effective 
rules directing the national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations to prohibit the listing of companies not 
meeting the requirements of section 301.33  Section 301 then 
provides that the Audit Committee34 of a public company is directly 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of 
 
 31. See, e.g., SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, Remarks at the 2003 
Washington Economic Policy Conference, National Association for Business 
Economics, Washington, D.C. (March 24, 2003): 
Over the past decade or more, at too many companies, the chief 
executive position has steadily increased in power and influence. In 
some cases, the CEO had become more of a monarch than a manager. 
Many boards have become gradually more deferential to the opinions, 
judgments and decisions of the CEO and senior management team. 
This deference has been an obstacle to directors’ ability to satisfy the 
responsibility that the owners—the shareholders—have delegated and 
entrusted to them. 
Id.  See also SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Initiatives Under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Before the College of Business and Economics, 
California State University, Fullerton, California (Jan. 28, 2003)  (stating “[t]oo 
often, we have seen examples of audit committees that failed abysmally in their 
oversight responsibilities”). 
 32. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Release No. 
33-8220 (Apr. 9, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, and 247 (2003) available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm (last visited Apr. 20) [hereinafter 
Audit Committee Release].  “Recent events involving alleged misdeeds by 
corporate executives and independent auditors . . . have highlighted the need for 
strong, competent and vigilant audit committees with real authority.” Id. at 4. 
 33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-
76 (2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(1)(A)).  
 34. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds a new section 3(a)(58) to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and defines an Audit Committee as follows: 
(A) a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the 
board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the 
accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits 
of the financial statements of the issuer; and (B) if no such committee 
exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of the 
issuer. 
§ 205, 116 Stat. at 773-74 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c). 
8
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the company’s auditors.35  The auditor is required to report directly 
to the audit committee.36  The section also sets a specific standard 
for the definition of independence of audit committee members, 
and requires all committee members to be independent.37 Next, 
the section requires the audit committee to implement an internal 
complaint system to receive complaints regarding audits, internal 
controls, and accounting matters from within the corporation, 
essentially bypassing management.38 Finally, section 301 requires 
that the audit committee have the authority to engage independent 
counsel and other advisers as it deems necessary to carry out its 
 
 35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(2)).  See also 
Audit Committee Release, supra note 32, at § II(B)(1). 
One of the audit committee’s primary functions is to enhance the 
independence of the audit function, thereby furthering the objectivity 
of financial reporting. The Commission has long recognized the 
importance of an auditor’s independence in the audit process . . . . 
One way to help promote auditor independence, then, is for the 
auditor to be hired, evaluated and, if necessary, terminated by the 
audit committee. This would help to align the auditor’s interests with 
those of shareholders. 
Id. 
 36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776.  See S. REP. NO. 107-205 at 23 
(2002) (“Recent events have highlighted the failure of companies’ internal audit 
committees to properly police their auditors and have raised awareness of the 
need for strong, competent audit committees with real authority.”). 
 37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  § 10A(m)(3)). 
In order to be considered to be independent for purposes of this 
paragraph, a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, 
other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, 
the board of directors, or any other board committee—(i) accept any 
consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) 
be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
Id.  See also Audit Committee Release, supra note 32, at § II(A)(1) (“An audit 
committee comprised of independent directors is better situated to assess 
objectively the quality of the issuer’s financial disclosure and the adequacy of 
internal controls than a committee that is affiliated with management.”). 
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776  (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(4)).  
“Management may not have the appropriate incentives to self-report all 
questionable practices . . . . The establishment of formal procedures for receiving 
and handling complaints should serve to facilitate disclosures, encourage proper 
individual conduct and alert the audit committee to potential problems before 
they have serious consequences.”  Audit Committee Release, supra note 32, at § 
II(C).  One of the challenges for corporations in complying with this requirement 
is how, practically, to set up a procedure for employees to communicate 
information to the audit committee without management intervention—
something which is otherwise generally foreign to corporate information flow. 
9
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duties, and that the corporation adequately fund the committee.39 
On April 25, 2003, the SEC promulgated its final rules 
“Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees” (Audit 
Committee Release) and promulgated a new Rule 10A-3 under the 
Exchange Act.40 In the Audit Committee Release, the SEC directed 
each national securities exchange and national securities 
association to provide the SEC, no later than July 15, 2003, 
proposed listing rules or amendments to rules that are in 
compliance with section 301, with such rules or amendments to be 
approved no later than December 1, 2003.41 Public companies are 
required to comply with such listing rules by the earlier of their 
first annual shareholders meeting after January 15, 2004 or 
October 31, 2004.42 
In new Rule 10A-3, the SEC added only minor language to the 
definition of “independence” for purposes of directing the NYSE 
and Nasdaq to adopt rules.43 In addition, consistent with section 
301, the SEC required only that audit committee members be 
independent,44 despite requests by a number of commenters that 
the SEC impose independence requirements beyond Sarbanes-
Oxley.45 The SEC had determined to keep the approach it 
 
 39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(5) and (6)). 
 40. See Audit Committee Release, supra note 32. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
In order to be considered to be independent for purposes of [the 
rule], a member of an audit committee of a listed issuer that is not an 
investment company may not, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other 
board committee: (A) Accept directly or indirectly any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof, provided that, unless the rules of the national securities 
exchange or national securities association provide otherwise, 
compensatory fees do not include the receipt of fixed amounts of 
compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred 
compensation) for prior service with the listed issuer (provided that 
such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service); 
or (B) Be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
Id. § VIII; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(m)(3)(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3(b)(1). 
 44. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b). 
 45. See Audit Committee Release, supra note 32, at § II(A)(1). The 
commenters requesting added independence requirements included, among 
others, the AFL-CIO, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, and the 
Teamsters union. Id. at n.41. 
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proposed in the proposing release and allow the self-regulatory 
organizations to adopt more stringent governance requirements.46  
The self-regulatory organizations (the SROs) took this charge from 
the SEC and proposed and adopted significant changes that go 
beyond the audit committee’s focus of section 301 and Rule 10A-3. 
b.  NYSE and Nasdaq Proposals on Director Independence 
The rules regarding the independence of public company 
directors by the NYSE and the Nasdaq are perhaps the most far-
reaching of their corporate governance initiatives. Each SRO is 
required by Rule 10A-3 to implement standards for audit 
committees consistent with that rule, which includes standards for 
the independence of audit committee members.47 However, the 
NYSE and Nasdaq have each gone beyond Rule 10A-3 and required 
a majority of the members of the boards of directors of each listed 
company to be independent, as well as providing for a number of 
other rules affecting boards and board committees. 
(1) NYSE Rules 
On August 16, 2002, the NYSE filed its first proposed rule 
changes with respect to director independence with the SEC, which 
were amended in filings with the SEC on April 4, 2003 and October 
8, 2003.  The SEC published the new rules for public comment, 
which became final on November 4, 2003.48  The NYSE adopted 
 
 46. Id. § II(A)(1). Among others, commenters supporting this approach 
included the American Bar Association, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), and the New York Stock Exchange.  Id. at n.42. 
 47. Id.  § II.A.1(a). 
 48. Self-Regulatory Organizations, NYSE and NASD Rulemaking: Relating to 
Corporate Governance, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter SRO Final Order Release].  See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule 
Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 
Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47672 (Apr. 11, 
2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
sro/34-47672.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter NYSE Governance 
Release].  It is important to note that many of the requirements of section 303A 
discussed below have been in existence for some time, including certain rules 
regarding audit committees. However, such rules have been substantially revised as 
a direct result of Sarbanes-Oxley. In addition, several of the rules, such as the rule 
requiring that a majority of the board of directors be independent, are entirely 
new.  See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text. 
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amendments to section 303A of the corporate governance 
standards in its Listed Company Manual.49 
Section 303A(1) requires that most50 NYSE listed companies 
have a board, a majority of whose members are independent 
directors.51  Section 303A further requires that the board of 
directors must affirmatively determine that a director has “no 
material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as 
a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company)” for the director to be independent 
under the rule.52 That section goes on to provide: “The basis for a 
board determination that a relationship is not material must be 
disclosed in the company’s annual proxy statement or on Form 10-
K . . . .”53 
Although the board is required to make a general 
determination that directors are independent, section 303A(2)(b) 
lists several relationships that would prevent a director from being 
independent: 
(i)   A director who is an employee, or whose immediate 
family member is an executive officer, of the company is 
not independent until three years after the end of such 
employment relationship. 
(ii)   A director who receives, or whose immediate family 
 
 49. New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual (2003), available at 
www.nyse.com/listed/listedcomanual.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter 
NYSE Listed Company Manual]. 
 50. Section 303A exempts from certain of its requirements listed companies 
that are “controlled companies” (companies that are more than 50% owned by a 
single individual, group, or another company), limited partnerships and 
companies in bankruptcy, closed-end mutual funds, business development 
companies, open-end mutual funds, certain types of trusts, and, to a certain 
extent, foreign private issuers (as such term is defined in Rule 3b-4 under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and companies that list only preferred or debt 
securities on the NYSE (with certain exceptions).  Id. § 303A(00). 
 51. Id. § 303A(1). In the commentary, the NYSE provides that “[e]ffective 
boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their 
responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the 
quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of 
interest.” Id. § 303A(1) cmt. 
 52. Id. § 303A(2)(a). “Material relationships can include commercial, 
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial 
relationships, among others. However, as the concern is independence from 
management, the [NYSE] does not view ownership of even a significant amount of 
stock, by itself, as a bar to an independence finding.” Id. § 303A(2)(a) cmt. 
(emphasis added). 
 53. Id. § 303A(2)(a) cmt. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/12
JOHNSON SIDES-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  6:53 PM 
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES  1161 
member receives, more than $100,000 per year in direct 
compensation from the listed company, other than 
director and committee fees and pension or other forms 
of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such 
compensation is not contingent in any way on continued 
service), is not independent until three years after he or 
she ceases to receive more than $100,000 per year in such 
compensation. 
(iii)  A director who is affiliated with or employed by, or 
whose immediate family member is affiliated with or 
employed in a professional capacity by, a present or 
former internal or external auditor of the company is not 
“independent” until three years after the end of the 
affiliation or the employment or auditing relationship. 
(iv)     A director who is employed, or whose immediate 
family member is employed, as an executive officer of 
another company where any of the listed company’s 
present executives serve on that company’s compensation 
committee is not “independent” until three years after the 
end of such service or the employment relationship. 
(v)     A director who is an executive officer or an 
employee, or whose immediate family member is an 
executive officer, of a company that makes payments to, 
or receives payments from, the listed company for 
property or services in an amount which, in any single 
fiscal year, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of 
such other company’s consolidated gross revenues, is not 
“independent” until three years after falling below such 
threshold.54 
Section 303A(3) also requires that the “non-management 
directors of each company must meet at regularly scheduled 
executive sessions without management.”55 The listed company is 
also required to disclose its procedures for how it chooses the head 
 
 54. Id. § 303A(2)(b). 
 55. Id. § 303A(3). 
“Non-management” directors are all those who are not company 
officers (as that term is defined in Rule 16a-1(f) under the Securities 
Act of 1933), and includes such directors who are not independent by 
virtue of a material relationship . . . . While this Section 303A(3) refers 
to meetings of non-management directors, if that group includes 
directors who are not independent under this Section 303A, listed 
companies should at least once a year schedule an executive session 
including only independent directors. 
Id. § 303A(3) cmt. 
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of such meetings.56 In addition, “[i]n order that interested parties 
may be able to make their concerns known to the non-
management directors, a company must disclose a method for 
parties to communicate directly with the presiding director or with 
the non-management directors as a group.”57 Consistent with its 
position on the importance of independent directors, the NYSE 
also required in section 303A that each listed company have (1) a 
nominating/corporate governance committee58 and (2) a 
compensation committee,59 each composed entirely of 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  See also NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § II.A (discussing 
the requirement for information to be transmitted to the audit committee set 
forth in Sarbanes-Oxley § 301). 
 58. NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303A(4)(a). 
The nominating/corporate governance committee must have a written 
charter that addresses: (i) the committee’s purposewhich, at 
minimum, must be to: identify individuals qualified to become board 
members, and to select, or to recommend that the board select, the 
director nominees for the next annual meeting of shareholders; and 
develop and recommend to the board a set of corporate governance 
principles applicable to the corporation; (ii) the committee’s goals and 
responsibilitieswhich must reflect, at a minimum, the board’s criteria 
for selecting new directors, and oversight of the evaluation of the 
board and management; and (iii) an annual performance evaluation 
of the committee. 
Id. § 303A(4)(b). The nominating/corporate governance committee “is also 
responsible for taking a leadership role in shaping the corporate governance of a 
corporation.” Id. § 303A(4) cmt. 
 59. Id. § 303A(5)(a). 
The compensation committee must have a written charter that 
addresses: (i) the committee’s purposewhich, at minimum, must be 
to discharge the board’s responsibilities relating to compensation of 
the company’s executives, and to produce an annual report on 
executive compensation for inclusion in the company’s proxy 
statement, or, if the company does not file a proxy statement, in the 
company’s annual report filed on Form 10-K with the SEC, in 
accordance with applicable rules and regulations; (ii) the committee’s 
duties and responsibilities which, at minimum, must be to: (A) review 
and approve corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO 
compensation, evaluate the CEO’s performance in light of those goals 
and objectives, and have sole authority to determine the CEO’s 
compensation level based on this evaluation; and (B) make 
recommendations to the board with respect to non-CEO 
compensation, incentive-compensation plans and equity-based plans; 
and (iii) an annual performance evaluation of the compensation 
committee. 
Id. § 303A(5)(b). 
Boards may allocate the responsibilities of the compensation 
committee to committees of their own denomination, provided that 
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independent directors. 
As to the audit committee, the NYSE narrowed the definition 
of “independence” found in section 303A(2) by adding the 
requirements of Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(1).60 The Rule also 
requires a company to have an audit committee that satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 10A-3 under the Exchange Act.61  Section 
303A, however, adds a requirement that the audit committee must 
have a minimum of three members,62 all of whom must be 
independent directors, as such term is set forth in section 
303A(2).63 The commentary to section 303A(6) also encourages 
audit committee members, and boards, to reduce the number of 
audit committees on which they sit.64 
Finally, section 303A(7)(b) requires audit committees to have 
a written charter that addresses the committee’s purpose.65  Part 
 
the committees are composed entirely of independent directors. Any 
such committee must have a published committee charter. 
Id. § 303A(5) cmt. 
 60. See Securities Exchange Act, supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
Understanding the higher burden that is on audit committee members, the NYSE 
stated that it “supports additional directors’ fees to compensate audit committee 
members for the significant time and effort they expend to fulfill their duties as 
audit committee members, but does not believe that any member of the audit 
committee should receive any compensation other than such director’s fees from 
the company.” NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303A(6) cmt. 
 61. NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303A(6). For Rule 10A-3, see 
Securities Exchange Act, supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 62. NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303A(7)(a). 
 63. Id. § 303A(7)(b). 
 64. See id. § 303A(6) cmt. 
Because of the audit committee’s demanding role and responsibilities, 
and the time commitment attendant to committee membership, each 
prospective audit committee member should evaluate carefully the 
existing demands on his or her time before accepting this important 
assignment. Additionally, if an audit committee member 
simultaneously serves on the audit committees of more than three 
public companies, and the listed company does not limit the number 
of audit committees on which its audit committee members serve, then 
in each case, the board must determine that such simultaneous service 
would not impair the ability of such member to effectively serve on the 
listed company’s audit committee and disclose such determination in 
the company’s annual proxy statement or, if the company does not file 
an annual proxy statement, in the company’s annual report on Form 
10-K filed with the SEC. 
Id. 
 65. Id. § 303A(7)(b)(i).  The committees purpose, at a minimum, must be to: 
(A) assist board oversight of (1) the integrity of the company’s 
financial statements, (2) the company’s compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements, (3) the independent auditor’s qualifications 
15
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(ii) of section 303A(7)(b) details “the duties and responsibilities of 
the audit committee”66 which, at a minimum, must include those 
set out in Rule 10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Exchange Act,67 
as well as to: 
(i) at least annually, obtain and review a report by the 
independent auditor describing: the firm’s internal 
quality-control procedures; any material issues raised by 
the most recent internal quality-control review, or peer 
review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or investigation by 
governmental or professional authorities, within the 
preceding five years, respecting one or more independent 
audits carried out by the firm, and any steps taken to deal 
with any such issues; and (to assess the auditor’s 
independence) all relationships between the independent 
auditor and the company;68 
(ii) discuss the company’s annual audited financial 
statements and quarterly financial statements with 
management and the independent auditor, including the 
company’s disclosures under “Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations;”69 
(iii) discuss the [company’s] earnings press releases, as 
well as financial information and earnings guidance 
provided to analysts and rating agencies;70 
(iv) discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and 
 
and independence, and (4) the performance of the company’s 
internal audit function and independent auditors; and (B) prepare the 
report required by the SEC’s proxy rules to be included in the 
company’s annual proxy statement . . . . 
Id. 
 66. Id. § 303A(7)(b)(ii). 
 67. Id. § 303A(7)(b)-(c). 
 68. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(i). 
In making its evaluation, the audit committee should take into account 
the opinions of management and the company’s internal auditors (or 
other personnel responsible for the internal audit function). In 
addition to assuring the regular rotation of the lead audit partner as 
required by law, the audit committee should further consider whether, 
in order to assure continuing auditor independence, there should be 
regular rotation of the audit firm itself. The audit committee should 
present its conclusions with respect to the independent auditor to the 
full board. 
Id. § 303A(7)(d)(i) cmt. 
 69. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(ii). 
 70. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(iii). 
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risk management;71 
(v) meet separately, periodically, with management, with 
internal auditors (or other personnel responsible for the 
internal audit function) and with independent auditors;72 
(vi) review with the independent auditor any audit 
problems or difficulties and management’s response; 73 
(vii) set clear hiring policies for employees or former 
employees of the independent auditors;74 and 
(viii) report regularly to the board of directors.75 
 
 71. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(iv). 
While it is the job of the CEO and senior management to assess and 
manage the company’s exposure to risk, the audit committee must 
discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which this is 
handled. The audit committee should discuss the company’s major 
financial risk exposures and the steps management has taken to 
monitor and control such exposures. The audit committee is not 
required to be the sole body responsible for risk assessment and 
management, but, as stated above, the committee must discuss 
guidelines and policies to govern the process by which risk assessment 
and management is undertaken. 
Id. § 303A(7)(d)(iv) cmt. 
 72. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(v). 
 73. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(vi). 
 74. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(vii). 
 75. Id. § 303A(7)(d)(viii). 
The audit committee should review with the full board any issues that 
arise with respect to the quality or integrity of the company’s financial 
statements, the company’s compliance with legal or regulatory 
requirements, the performance and independence of the company’s 
independent auditors, or the performance of the internal audit 
function. 
Id. § 303A(7)(d)(viii) cmt.  The general commentary to section 303A(7)(d) states: 
While the fundamental responsibility for the company’s financial 
statements and disclosures rests with management and the 
independent auditor, the audit committee must review: (A) major 
issues regarding accounting principles and financial statement 
presentations, including any significant changes in the company’s 
selection or application of accounting principles, and major issues as to 
the adequacy of the company’s internal controls and any special audit 
steps adopted in light of material control deficiencies; (B) analyses 
prepared by management and/or the independent auditor setting 
forth significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in 
connection with the preparation of the financial statements, including 
analyses of the effects of alternative GAAP methods on the financial 
statements; (C) the effect of regulatory and accounting initiatives, as 
well as off-balance sheet structures, on the financial statements of the 
company; and (D) the type and presentation of information to be 
included in earnings press releases (paying particular attention to any 
use of “pro forma,” or “adjusted” non-GAAP, information), as well as 
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Section 303A(7)(b) requires “an annual performance 
evaluation of the audit committee.”76  In addition, the NYSE audit 
committee rules provide that each NYSE company must have an 
internal audit function.77 
The NYSE next requires that all listed “companies must adopt 
and disclose corporate governance guidelines.”78 The commentary 
to 303A(9) provides that the guidelines must address:79 director 
qualification standards;80 director responsibilities;81 director access 
to management and, as necessary and appropriate, independent 
advisors;82 director compensation;83 director orientation and 
 
review any financial information and earnings guidance provided to 
analysts and rating agencies. 
Id. § 303A(7)(d) gen. cmt. 
 76. Id. § 303A(7)(2)(b)(iii). 
 77. Id. § 303A(7)(e). “Listed companies must maintain an internal audit 
function to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing 
assessments of the company’s risk management processes and system of internal 
control. A company may choose to outsource this function to a [third party service 
provider] other than its independent auditor.” Id. § 303A(7)(e) cmt. 
 78. Id. § 303A(9). 
No single set of guidelines would be appropriate for every company, 
but certain key areas of universal importance include director 
qualifications and responsibilities, responsibilities of key board 
committees, and director compensation. Given the importance of 
corporate governance, each listed company’s website must include its 
corporate governance guidelines and the charters of its most 
important committees (including at least the audit, and if applicable, 
compensation and nominating committees). 
Id. § 303A(9) cmt. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. “These standards should, at minimum, reflect the independence 
requirements set forth in Sections 303A(1) and (2). Companies may also address 
other substantive qualification requirements, including policies limiting the 
number of boards on which a director may sit, and director tenure, retirement 
and succession.” Id. 
 81. Id.  “These responsibilities should clearly articulate what is expected from 
a director, including basic duties and responsibilities with respect to attendance at 
board meetings and advance review of meeting materials.”  Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
Director compensation guidelines should include general principles 
for determining the form and amount of director compensation (and 
for reviewing those principles, as appropriate). The board should be 
aware that questions as to directors’ independence may be raised when 
directors’ fees and emoluments exceed what is customary. Similar 
concerns may be raised when the company makes substantial 
charitable contributions to organizations in which a director is 
affiliated, or enters into consulting contracts with (or provides other 
indirect forms of compensation to) a director. The board should 
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continuing education;84 management succession;85 and annual 
performance evaluation of the board.86 
Finally, section 303A requires listed foreign private issuers to 
“disclose any significant ways in which their corporate governance 
practices differ from those followed by domestic companies under 
NYSE listing standards.”87  Each company chief executive officer 
must “certify to the NYSE each year that he or she is not aware of 
any violation by the company of NYSE corporate governance listing 
standards,”88 and “[t]he NYSE may issue a public reprimand letter 
to any listed company that violates a NYSE listing standard.”89 
As we have discussed, the NYSE rules in response to Sarbanes-
Oxley go far beyond the specific requirements of that law and the 
subsequent SEC  rulemaking.  The changes proposed by the 
Nasdaq and approved by the SEC are no less far-reaching in their 
scope. 
 
critically evaluate each of these matters when determining the form 
and amount of director compensation, and the independence of a 
director. 
Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. “Succession planning should include policies and principles for CEO 
selection and performance review, as well as policies regarding succession in the 
event of an emergency or the retirement of the CEO.” Id. 
 86. Id. “The board should conduct a self-evaluation at least annually to 
determine whether it and its committees are functioning effectively.” Id. 
 87. Id. § 303A(11). 
 88. Id. § 303A(12)(a). The intent of this provision is to “focus the CEO and 
senior management on the company’s compliance with the listing standards.”  Id. 
§ 303A(12)(a) cmt.  Subsection (b) requires that “[e]ach listed company CEO 
must promptly notify the NYSE [in writing] after any executive officer of the listed 
company becomes aware of any material non-compliance with any applicable 
provisions of this section 303A.”  Id. § 303A(12)(b).  This has the effect of forcing 
the CEO to put into place a continuous reporting regime that would disclose such 
information up the ladder to the CEO. 
 89. Id. § 303A(13). 
Suspending trading in or delisting a company can be harmful to the 
very shareholders that the NYSE listing standards seek to protect; the 
NYSE must therefore use these measures sparingly and judiciously. For 
this reason it is appropriate for the NYSE to have the ability to apply a 
lesser sanction to deter companies from violating its corporate 
governance (or other) listing standards. Accordingly, the NYSE may 
issue a public reprimand letter to a company that it determines has 
violated a NYSE listing standard.  For companies that repeatedly or 
flagrantly violate NYSE listing standards, suspension and delisting 
remain the ultimate penalties. 
Id. § 303A(13) cmt. 
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(2) Nasdaq Proposal 
On October 9, 2002, the Nasdaq submitted to the SEC its 
initial rule proposal on corporate governance.90 The Nasdaq 
subsequently filed amendments to the rules on March 11, 2003,91 
July 16, 2003,92 and October 10, 2003.93  In the SRO Final Order on 
November 4, 2003, the SEC approved the proposed Nasdaq rules 
and amendments.94  In the releases, the Nasdaq proposed 
amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 “to provide greater 
transparency regarding the definition of independence and to 
increase the roles and responsibilities of independent directors and 
independent board committees.”95 
Stating that “[i]ndependent directors . . . play an important 
role in assuring investor confidence,”96 the Nasdaq has required 
that “[a] majority of the board of directors must be comprised of 
independent directors as defined in Rule 4200.”97 The Nasdaq 
states that “[t]hrough the exercise of independent judgment, 
[independent directors] act on behalf of investors to maximize 
shareholder value in the companies they oversee and guard against 
conflicts of interest. Requiring that the board be comprised of a 
majority of independent directors empowers such directors to 
more effectively carry out these responsibilities.”98 
NASD Rule 4200(a)(15) defines “independent director” as “a 
 
 90. SRO Final Order Release, supra note 48. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  See Letter from Mary M. Dunbar, Vice President and Deputy General 
Counsel, Nasdaq, to Katherine A. England, Assistant Director, Division of Market 
Regulations, Securities, and Exchange Commission, dated October 9, 2003, 
available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/SR-NASD-2002-141_Amendment_3. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter October 2003 Nasdaq Letter]. 
 94. SRO Final Order Release, supra note 48. 
 95. October 2003 Nasdaq letter, supra note 93, at 2. 
 96. October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 49 (discussing IM 4350-4, 
Board Independence and Independent Committees). 
 97. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. Relating to Proposed Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding 
Board Independence and Independent Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-47516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451, 14,452 (Mar. 17, 2003).  See The Nasdaq Stock 
Market, Inc. Corporate Governance Rules 4200, 4200A, 4350, 4350A and 4360, 
and Associated Interpretive Material, at 10 available at http://www.nasdaq. 
com/about/corporategovernance.pdf (Dec. 31, 2003) (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter Nasdaq Corporate Governance]. 
 98. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,453.  See Nasdaq Corporate Governance, supra note 97, 
at 28. 
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person other than an officer or employee of the company or its 
subsidiaries or any other individual having a relationship which, in 
the opinion of the company’s board of directors,99 would interfere 
with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the 
responsibilities of a director.”100 NASD Rule 4200(a)(15) defines in 
detail who would not be considered independent:101 
(A) a director who is, or at any time during the past three 
years was, employed by the company or by any parent or 
subsidiary of the company; 
(B) a director who accepted or who has a Family Member 
who accepted any  payments from the company or any  
parent or subsidiary of the company in excess of $60,000 
during the current or any of the past three fiscal years, 
other than the following[:] 
(i) compensation for board or board committee 
service; 
(ii) payments arising solely from investments in the 
company’s securities; 
(iii) compensation paid to a Family Member who is a 
non-executive employee of the company or a parent 
or subsidiary of the company; 
(iv) benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan, or 
non-discretionary compensation; or 
(v) loans permitted under Section 13(k) of the 
 
 99. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452.  See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 
22 (“Nasdaq has . . . added a requirement that companies identify in their proxy 
those directors that the board has determined to be independent because Nasdaq 
believes this enhances transparency and investor confidence.”). 
 100. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452.  “The board has a responsibility to make an 
affirmative determination that no such relationship exists through the application 
of Rule 4200.” October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 5. 
 101. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14452. See also October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, 
at 22: 
While several commenters [to previous releases of the rules] suggested 
that Nasdaq’s independence thresholds should be subject to a 
presumption that can be rebutted or otherwise be subject to the 
board’s judgment, Nasdaq declined to follow these suggestions, as 
Nasdaq believes that clear, enforceable standards will give investors 
greater confidence that only directors who meet these standards can be 
held out as independent, and such an approach also eases 
administration by companies, and monitoring compliance by Nasdaq. 
Nasdaq also declined to adopt suggestions from commenters that there 
be lower standards for small companies, as Nasdaq believes that this 
could have an adverse impact on investor confidence. 
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[Securities Exchange Act of 1934]. 
(C)  a director who is a Family Member of an individual 
who is, or at any time during the past three years was, 
employed by the company or by any parent or subsidiary 
of the company as an executive officer . . . . 
(D) a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a 
partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive 
officer of, any organization to which the company made, 
or from which the company received, payments for 
property or services in the current or any of the past three 
fiscal years that exceed 5% of the recipient’s consolidated 
gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is 
more, other than the following[:] 
(i) payments arising solely from investments in the 
company’s securities; or 
(ii)  payments under non-discretionary charitable 
contribution matching programs. 
(E)  a director of the listed company who is, or has a 
Family Member who is, employed as an executive officer 
of another entity where at any time during the past three 
years any of the executive officers of the listed company 
serve on the compensation committee of such other 
entity; or 
(F)  a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a 
current partner of the company’s outside auditor, or was a 
partner or employee of the company’s outside auditor 
who worked on the company’s audit at any time during 
the past three years.102 
Much like NYSE section 303A,103 NASD Rule 4350(c)104 lists 
many activities that the independent directors are required to 
perform.  Rule 4350(c)(2) requires that “[i]ndependent directors 
must have regularly scheduled meetings at which only independent 
directors are present (‘executive sessions’).”105  Rule 4350(c)(3)(A)-
(B) provides that, with respect to the compensation of all officers 
of the company, including the chief executive officer,  
 
 102. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452. 
 103. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 104. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452. 
 105. Id. at 14,452.  “Regularly scheduled executive sessions will encourage and 
enhance communication among independent directors. It is contemplated that 
executive sessions will occur at least twice a year, and perhaps more frequently, in 
conjunction with regularly scheduled board meetings.”  Id. at 14,453. 
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“[c]ompensation . . . must be determined, or recommended to the 
Board for determination,106 either by: (i) a majority of the 
independent directors, or (ii) a compensation committee 
comprised solely of independent directors.”107  Rule 4350(c)(4)(A) 
requires the same process with respect to the nomination of 
directors of the company.108  Concerning such nominations, 
“[e]ach issuer must certify that it has adopted a formal written 
charter or board resolution, as applicable, addressing the 
nominations process and such related matters as may be required 
under the federal securities laws.”109  Furthermore, “[i]ndependent 
director oversight of director nominations shall not apply in cases 
where the right to nominate a director legally belongs to a third 
party. However, this does not relieve a company’s obligation to 
comply with the committee composition requirements in Rule 
4350(c) or Rule 4350(d) [the audit committee rule].”110  It is 
important to note that Rule 4350(c)(4) “is not applicable to a 
company if the company is subject to a binding obligation that 
 
 106. A committee’s ability to recommend certain actions to the board, rather 
than simply making the outright determination, is necessary because of certain 
limitations that state corporate laws place on committees, including, as to certain 
determinations, Delaware.  See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 50. 
 107. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452.  “Independent director oversight of executive 
officer compensation helps assure that appropriate incentives are in place, 
consistent with the board’s responsibility to maximize shareholder value. The rule 
is intended to provide flexibility for an issuer to choose an appropriate board 
structure and to reduce resource burdens, while ensuring independent director 
control of compensation decisions.”  See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 
93, at 50. 
 108. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,452 (requiring director nominees to be selected, or 
recommended for the Board’s selection, either by: (i) a majority of the 
independent directors, or (ii) a nominations committee composed solely of 
independent directors).  See also October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 50 
(“Independent director oversight of nominations enhances investor confidence in 
the selection of well-qualified director nominees, as well as independent nominees 
as required by the rules.”). 
 109. October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 10. 
 110. Id. at 11. 
This rule does not apply in cases where the right to nominate a 
director legally belongs to a third party. For example, investors may 
negotiate the right to nominate directors in connection with an 
investment in the company, holders of preferred stock may be 
permitted to nominate or appoint directors upon certain defaults, or 
the company may be a party to a shareholder’s agreement that 
allocates the right to nominate some directors. Because the right to 
nominate directors in these cases does not reside with the company, 
independent director approval would not be required. 
Id. at 50-51. 
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requires a director nomination structure inconsistent with [the] 
rule and such obligation pre-dates the . . . rule.”111  Finally, Rule 
4350(c)(5) provides that “[a] Controlled Company112 is exempt 
from the requirements of this Rule 4350(c), except for the 
requirements of subsection (c)(2) which pertain to executive 
sessions of independent directors.  A Controlled Company relying 
upon this exemption must disclose in its annual meeting proxy 
statement . . . that it is a Controlled Company and the basis for that 
determination.”113 
Nasdaq Rule 4350(d) addresses the requirements with respect 
to audit committees.114 Rule 4350(d)(1) first requires each 
company to “certify that it has adopted a formal written audit 
committee charter and that the audit committee has reviewed and 
reassessed the adequacy of the formal written charter on an annual 
basis.”115  The charter must specify the following: 
(A) the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities, 
and how it carries out those responsibilities, including 
structure, processes, and membership requirements; 
(B) the audit committee’s responsibility for ensuring its 
receipt from the outside auditors of a formal written 
statement delineating all relationships between the 
auditor and the company, consistent with Independence 
Standards Board Standard 1, and the audit committee’s 
responsibility for actively engaging in a dialogue with the 
auditor with respect to any disclosed relationships or 
 
 111. Id. at 11. 
 112. A Controlled Company is a company of which more than 50% of the 
voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another company.  NASD Rule 
4350(c)(5), 68 Fed. Reg. 14,553. 
 113. October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 11. 
This exception recognizes that majority shareholders, including parent 
companies, have the right to select directors and control certain key 
decisions, such as executive officer compensation, by virtue of their 
ownership rights. In order for a group to exist for purposes of this 
Rule, the shareholders must have publicly filed a notice that they are 
acting as a group (e.g., a Schedule 13D [under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934]). A Controlled Company not relying upon this exemption 
need not provide any special disclosures about its controlled status. It 
should be emphasized that this controlled company exemption does 
not extend to the audit committee requirements under Rule 4350(d) 
or the requirement for executive sessions of independent directors 
under Rule 4350(c)(2). 
Id. at 51. 
 114. See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 45-50. 
 115. NASD Rule 4350(d)(1), 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,453. 
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services that may impact the objectivity and independence 
of the auditor and for taking, or recommending that the 
full board take, appropriate action to oversee the 
independence of the outside auditor; 
(C) the committee’s purpose of overseeing the 
accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer 
and the audits of the financial statements of the issuer; 
[and] 
(D) the specific audit committee responsibilities and 
authority set forth in Rule 4350(d)(3).116 
Rule 4350(d)(2)(A)117 next addresses the composition of the 
audit committee, requiring that each company must have, and 
certify that it has and will continue to have, an audit committee of 
at least three members, each of whom must: 
(i) be independent as defined under Rule 4200(a)(15);118 
(ii) meet the criteria for independence set forth in Rule 
10A-3(b)(1) under the [Exchange Act] (subject to the 
exemptions provided in Rule 10A-3(c));119 (iii) not have 
participated in the preparation of the financial statements 
of the company or any current subsidiary of the company 
at any time during the past three years; and (iv) be able to 
read and understand fundamental financial statements, 
including a company’s balance sheet, income statement, 
and cash flow statement. Additionally, each issuer must 
certify that it has, and will continue to have, at least one 
member of the audit committee who has past employment 
experience in finance or accounting, requisite 
professional certification in accounting, or any other 
comparable experience or background which results in 
the individual’s financial sophistication, including being 
or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer or other senior officer with financial oversight 
 
 116. Nasdaq Corporate Governance, supra note 97, at 11-12.  See infra notes 
127-130 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4350(d)(3)). 
 117. NASD Rule 4350(d)(2)(A), 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,553. 
 118. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (defining “independence”). 
 119. See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 52. 
In addition to satisfying the independent director requirements under 
Rule 4200, audit committee members must meet the criteria for 
independence set forth in Rule 10A-3(b)(1) under the [Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934] . . . they must not accept any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the company other than for 
board service, and they must not be an affiliated person of the issuer. 
Id.  See also supra text accompanying note 43 (discussing Rule 10A-3(b)(1)). 
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responsibilities.120 
Rule 4350(d)(3) provides specific direction on audit 
committee responsibilities and authority, providing that: 
The audit committee must have the specific audit 
committee responsibilities and authority necessary to 
comply with Rule 10A-3(b)(2), (3), (4) and (5) under the 
[Exchange Act] . . . , concerning responsibilities relating 
to: (i) registered public accounting firms, (ii) complaints 
relating to accounting, internal accounting controls or 
auditing matters, (iii) authority to engage advisors, and 
(iv) funding as determined by the audit committee.121 
Rule 4350(m), much like NYSE section 303A(11),122 requires 
that “[a]n issuer must provide Nasdaq with prompt notification 
after an executive officer of the issuer becomes aware of any 
material noncompliance by the issuer with the requirements of this 
Rule 4350.”123 
Finally, in a separate, but related, rulemaking initiative, the 
Nasdaq approved Rule 4350(h), which affects the board’s, and 
more particularly the audit committee’s, duties by requiring that 
each issuer 
conduct an appropriate review of all related party 
transactions for potential conflict of interest situations on 
an ongoing basis and all such transactions must be 
approved by the company’s audit committee or another 
independent body of the board of directors.  For purposes 
of this rule, the term “related party transaction” shall refer 
to transactions required to be disclosed pursuant to SEC 
Regulation S-K, Item 404.124 
 
 120. See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 52 (“A director who 
qualifies as an audit committee financial expert under Item 401(h) of Regulation 
S-K . . . is presumed to qualify as a financially sophisticated audit committee 
member under Rule 4350(d)(2)(A).”). See also infra text accompanying notes 131-
144 (discussing financial expert requirements of Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K). 
 121. Nasdaq Corporate Governance, supra note 97, at 14.  See supra note 43 
and accompanying text (discussing requirements of Rule 10A-3(b)). 
 122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 123. See October 2003 Nasdaq Letter, supra note 93, at 16. “[S]uch disclosure is 
required under Rule 10A-3 with respect to audit committees, and Nasdaq believes 
it is appropriate to expand this disclosure to all corporate governance 
requirements.”  Id. at 24. 
 124. SRO Final Order Release, supra note 48, (c)(12); Letter from John D. 
Nachman, Senior Attorney, Nasdaq, to Katherine A. England, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (October 2, 2003), at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/SR-
NASD-2002-80_Amendment_2.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).  See also Board 
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c.  Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert 
Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley directed the SEC to issue rules 
requiring each public company to disclose “whether or not, and if 
not, the reasons therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is 
comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such 
term is defined by the [SEC].”125  Section 407 outlined certain 
considerations for the SEC in its rulemaking, but left the final 
definition to the SEC.126 Although Sarbanes-Oxley inserted section 
407 in the section entitled “Enhanced Financial Disclosures,” with 
other provisions aimed at financial disclosures, the effect of the 
section is to require each public company audit committee to have 
at least one financial expert, because most public companies would 
not wish to disclose that they did not have a financial expert. In 
addition, the section, together with the SEC’s, NYSE’s, and 
Nasdaq’s subsequent rules, has the effect of determining at least 
one person who is qualified to sit on the board of a public 
company. 
On March 3, 2003, the SEC promulgated an amendment to 
Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K (Item 401(h)), which is the rule 
implementing section 407.127 Item 401(h) requires public 
companies to disclose whether they have at least one financial 
expert on their audit committee, and if not why not, in their next 
annual report following July 15, 2003.128 Item 401(h) also defines 
“audit committee financial expert,” including a listing of the means 
by which the person must have come to such expertise.129 The 
 
Duties, SEC Release No. 48,137 (proposed July 8, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 42,152, 
42,152  (posting the original language for comment). 
 125. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790 
(2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a)).  “The Committee believes the 
effectiveness of the audit committee depends in part on its members’ knowledge 
of and experience in auditing and financial matters.”  S. REP. NO. 107-205 at 32 
(2002). 
 126. 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(b)). 
 127. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, and 249 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm [hereinafter Section 407 Release] 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2004); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228 and 229 (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177a.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 
2004). 
 128. Section 407 Release, supra note 127, at §§ II(A)(2) and II(E).  The 
company must also disclose the name of the audit committee financial expert. Id. 
at § II(A)(2). 
 129. Id.  The SEC adopted the term “audit committee financial expert” rather 
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SEC’s definition of an audit committee financial expert utilized 
and expanded on the guidance provided by Congress in section 
407.130 To ensure that the designated audit committee financial 
expert did not face greater liability than any other board 
members,131 the SEC clarified that the audit committee financial 
expert would not be subject to greater duties or obligations under 
the securities laws, and declared that such person is not deemed an 
“expert” for purposes of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.132  
The board of directors is charged with making the determination 
of whether a person qualifies as the audit committee financial 
expert.133 
In commentary in the NYSE Governance Release, the NYSE 
went beyond section 407 and the mere disclosure requirement of 
Item 401(h) and stated that “[e]ach member of the committee 
must be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by 
 
than “financial expert,” as section 407 had used.  Id. § II(A)(1). 
 130. Id. The SEC’s definition of “financial expert” in the proposing release  
proved to be one of the more controversial aspects of the SEC’s rulemaking under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  See Proposed Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406, and 
407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8138 
(proposed Oct. 22, 2002), 68 Fed. Reg. 42,152, 42,152-53  available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8138.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).  
Many commenters expressed concern that the SEC’s definition of financial expert 
was “too restrictive.” Section 407 Release, supra note 127, § II(A)(4)(b). Indeed, at 
least one commenter pointed out that successful businessman Warren Buffet, who 
might be the envy of any audit committee, would not meet the definition as 
originally proposed.  SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Address at the 
National Economists Club (Apr. 7, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch040703cag.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
 131. Several commenters noted this concern.  See Section 407 Release, supra 
note 127, § II(A)(5). 
 132. Id. 
We find no support in [Sarbanes-Oxley] or in related legislative history 
that Congress intended to change the duties, obligations or liability of 
any audit committee member, including the audit committee financial 
expert, through [section 407] . . . . Our new rule provides that whether 
a person is, or is not, an audit committee financial expert does not 
alter his or her duties, obligations or liabilities. We believe this should 
be the case under federal and state law. 
Id. 
 133. Id. § II(A)(6). 
We believe that the board of directors in its entirety, as the most broad-
based body with the company, is best-equipped to make the 
determination. We think that it is appropriate that any such determination 
will be subject to relevant state law principles such as the business judgment 
rule. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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the company’s board in its business judgment, or must become 
financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or 
her appointment to the audit committee.”134  The NYSE also 
required that all listed companies have at least one member of its 
audit committee that has “accounting or related financial 
management expertise, as the company’s board interprets such 
qualification in its business judgment.”135  In making such 
determination, the board may presume that a person who meets 
the requirements of Item 401(e) of Regulation S-K136 has such 
expertise.  The Nasdaq similarly expanded on section 407 in its 
requirements as to audit committee members’ financial 
sophistication.137 
d.  Audit Committee Preapproval Requirements 
Section 202 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that all auditing and 
non-audit services provided to an issuer by its auditor be pre-
approved by the audit committee, except for certain de-minimis 
exceptions.138  Any approvals under this section must be disclosed 
in the company’s periodic reports under the Exchange Act.139 
Although section 202 does not appear to directly impact the 
fiduciary duty of audit committee members, it does add to the 
growing list of items that Sarbanes-Oxley specifically requires 
directors to address. 
e.  Enhanced Conflict of Interest Provisions 
Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley makes it illegal for public 
companies to directly or indirectly make loans to their officers, 
except for certain, limited reasons.140  Although seemingly aimed at 
prohibiting “abusive” loans to officers of public companies, the 
effect of section 402 is to limit altogether the ability of a company’s 
board of directors to enter into creative, and otherwise legal, 
arrangements with the company’s officers.  In other words, in the 
 
 134. NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303(A)(6) cmt. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 138. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 772 (2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10A(i)). 
 139. Id. at 773  (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 
10(A)(i)(2)). 
 140. Id. at 787  (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §13(k)). 
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case of loans to officers, Congress has in essence determined that 
no reasonable board of directors could make a determination to 
approve such a loan.141   
Having examined the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, and 
related rulemaking, aimed at the board, we now turn our focus to 
those provisions aimed at executive officers. 
2.  Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions Intended to Regulate the Fiduciary 
Duties of Officers. 
With the exception of section 406,142 the provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley aimed at management of public companies are 
intended to specifically regulate the conduct of officers as to 
certain matters. Sarbanes-Oxley and the related SEC and SRO 
rulemaking were intended to focus senior management’s attention 
on financial matters and public disclosure.143 
a.  Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports 
Because of public perception that many senior corporate 
officers lacked focus on financial and disclosure matters,144 section 
 
 141. Section 402 was self-executing and required no additional SEC 
rulemaking.  Id. 
 142. See infra note 146, section II(B)(2)(d). 
 143. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-205 (2002). “The bill also requires steps to 
enhance the direct responsibility of senior corporate management for financial 
reporting and for the quality of financial disclosures made by public companies.” 
Id. at 2. 
 144. See id. 
The bill also contains a number of provisions aimed at corporate management. 
Defects in procedures for monitoring financial results and controls have 
been blamed for recent corporate failures. The bill therefore requires 
CEOs and CFOs to certify their companies’ financial reports . . . . The 
Committee believes that management should be held responsible for 
the financial representations of their companies. 
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).  See also Cynthia A. Glassman, Address at the Darden 
Distinguished Speaker Series (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch032603cag.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
The new [section 302 and section 906] certification requirements have 
a few lessons to offer to senior executives . . . .  First, you have an 
obligation to understand your business; willful blindness is a 
dereliction of duty, and ignorance is not an excuse for not knowing 
what is going on in your company. Second, you need to use the power 
and prestige of your office to ensure that investor capital you hold in 
trust is secure; if you tolerate—or, worse, encourage—a corporate 
culture that allows for large-scale fraud, you will be accountable. Third, 
you need to make sure that disclosure controls and systems are in place 
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302(a)145 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires the principal executive officer 
and the principal financial officer (or officers) to sign the quarterly 
and annual reports of the company and to certify that: 
1. The officer has reviewed the report; 
2. Based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not 
contain any untrue statement of material fact or omit a 
statement of material fact; 
3. Based on the officer’s knowledge, the financial 
statements fairly present in all material respects the 
financial condition and results of operations of the 
issuer;146 
4. That the signing officers 
(a)  are responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls; 
(b) have designed such internal controls to ensure 
that material information is made known to such 
officers; 
(c)  have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s 
internal controls; and 
(d)  have presented in the report their conclusions 
about the effectiveness of their internal controls; 
5. That the signing officers have disclosed to the auditors 
and the audit committee 
(a)  all significant deficiencies in the design or 
 
to enable you to provide full and accurate reports to the Board and 
investors regarding the company’s operations and financial condition. 
And fourth, public disclosure is one of the most important jobs you 
have as a corporate officer—don’t take it lightly. 
Id. § IV. 
 145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). 
 146. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual 
Reports, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, and 274 (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8124.htm [hereinafter Section 302 Release].  
In its rulemaking under section 302, the SEC stated that this certification 
is not limited to a representation that the financial statements and 
other financial information have been presented in accordance with 
“generally accepted accounting principles” . . . . We believe that 
Congress intended this statement to provide assurances that the 
financial information disclosed in a report, viewed in its entirety, meets 
a standard of overall material accuracy and completeness that is 
broader than financial reporting requirements under generally 
accepted accounting principles. 
Id. § II(B)(3). 
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operation of internal controls; and 
(b)   any fraud that involves management or other 
employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s 
internal controls; and 
6.  The signing officers have indicated in the report 
whether or not there were significant changes in internal 
controls or other factors that could significantly affect 
internal controls, including any corrective actions with 
regard to significant deficiencies and material 
weaknesses.147 
Section 302 gave the SEC thirty days to make effective rules 
implementing the section.148  On August 29, 2002, the SEC 
promulgated several rules and items of disclosure to Exchange Act 
Reports to implement section 302.149  Interestingly, in discussing 
the two certifications set forth in section 302(a)(2) and (a)(3), the 
SEC stated that “[b]oth of the foregoing certification statements 
are to be made based on the knowledge of the certifying officer. 
This is not meant to change the current obligations of corporate 
officers in connection with the discharge of their duties.”150 
Although the SEC stated that the “obligations” of officers were not 
changed following the adoption of section 302 and the 
promulgation of the rules under section 302, at least the discharge 
of the officer’s duties would certainly be affected. For example, the 
officer could not argue that compliance with U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles was sufficient to discharge the 
officer’s duty to report the company’s financial affairs to its 
stockholders. This is particularly the case because a violation of 
section 302 could subject an officer to liability for violating section 
13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and to private actions for 
violation of section 10(b) under that Act and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated under that Act.151 
The Section 302 Release rules also require that public 
companies maintain disclosure controls and procedures, much as 
they are already required to maintain internal controls for financial 
information.152 The SEC’s intent in promulgating the disclosure 
 
 147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7241). 
 148. Id. § 302(c). 
 149. See Section 302 Release, supra note 146. 
 150. Id. § II(B)(3). 
 151. Id. § II(B)(6). 
 152. Id. (promulgating Securities Exchange Act, supra note 43, at 13a-15 and 
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control rules was “to assist principal executive and financial officers 
in the discharge of their responsibilities in making the required 
certifications, as well as to discharge their responsibilities in 
providing accurate and complete information to security 
holders . . . .”153  The new rules also require the company, under the 
supervision of the principal executive and financial officers, to 
conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the disclosure 
controls.154 
Section 906155 of Sarbanes-Oxley, much like section 302, 
requires officers to make certain certifications, subject to criminal 
penalties, regarding compliance with securities laws. Unlike section 
302, section 906 was effective upon passage of the Act. 
b.  Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits 
Section 304156 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that, if a public 
company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to 
material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirement 
under the securities laws, as a result of misconduct, then the 
principal executive officer and the principal financial officer(s) 
must reimburse the corporation for (i) any bonus or other 
incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by such 
person during the twelve-month period following the first public 
issuance of the defective report and (ii) any profits realized from 
the sale of securities of the corporation during that twelve-month 
period.  Section 304 was self-executing upon effectiveness of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.157 The intent of this section seems 
 
15d-15). The statutory section and rules related to internal financial controls are 
found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b)(2), and Exchange Act Rules 
13b2-1 and 12b2-2 promulgated under Section 13(b)(2). 
 153. Section 302 Release, supra note 146. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Pub. L. No. 170-204, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (2002) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1350). 
 156. Id. 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243). 
 157. See S. REP. NO. 107-205 (2002). 
Recent events have raised concern about management benefiting from 
unsound financial statements, many of which ultimately result in 
corporate restatements. The President has recommended that “CEOs 
or other officers should not be allowed to profit from erroneous 
financial statements,” and that “CEO bonuses and other incentive-
based forms of compensation [sh]ould be disgorged in cases of 
accounting restatement and misconduct.” 
Id. at 26. 
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straightforward enough—forcing the principal officers of the 
company to pay more attention to the company’s financial 
reporting and to dissuade management from focusing on short-
term gain.158 
c.  Management Assessment of Internal Controls 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporations to 
include an internal control report in each annual report. The 
internal control report shall: 
(1) State the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting, and 
(2) Contain an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for 
financial reporting. 159 
In addition, section 404 requires each registered public 
accounting firm of a public corporation to certify as to the 
management assessment contained in paragraph 2 above.160 
The SEC promulgated rules under section 404 on August 14, 
2003, as directed by the Act.161  These rules sought to not only 
incorporate the required provisions of section 404, but to expand 
on those provisions and provide additional guidance to public 
companies.162  The SEC amended Item 307 of Regulation S-K (as 
well as other similar regulations) to require a company’s annual 
report to include an internal control report of management 
 
 158. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Address at the Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition (May 9, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch050903cag.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). “[I]t should be clear from the 
recent scandals that there is a risk that some executives will manage to short-term 
performance goals to maximize their compensation. For its part, Sarbanes-Oxley 
provides an incentive against  this type of conduct.” Id. 
 159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 404(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7262). 
 160. Id. § 404(b) (stating also that the accounting firm’s attestation could not 
be pursuant to a separate engagement of the accounting firm).  See also Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing Standard No. 2 providing 
additional standards for the auditor’s certification. (The authors are indebted to 
Professor Larry Cunningham for this point.) 
 161. Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and 
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 
228, 229, 240, 249, 270, and 274 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm [hereinafter Section 404 Release]. 
 162. See generally id. § II(B). 
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containing: 163 
(1)  A statement of management’s responsibility for 
establishing and maintaining adequate internal control 
over financial reporting for the company; 
(2)  A statement identifying the framework used by 
management to conduct the required evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control over 
financial reporting; 
(3)  Management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company’s internal control over financial reporting as of 
the end of the company’s most recent fiscal year, 
including a statement as to whether or not the company’s 
internal control over financial reporting is effective. The 
assessment must include disclosure of any “material 
weaknesses” in the company’s internal control over 
financial reporting identified by management. 
Management is not permitted to conclude that the 
company’s internal control over financial reporting is 
effective if there are one or more material weaknesses in 
the company’s internal control over financial reporting; 
and 
(4)  A statement that the registered public accounting 
firm that audited the financial statements included in the 
annual report has issued an attestation report on 
management’s assessment of the registrant’s internal 
control over financial reporting.164 
Finally, the SEC required public companies to include in their 
quarterly reports whether any change in the company’s internal 
controls has occurred “that has materially affected, or is reasonably 
likely to materially affect, the [company’s] internal control over 
financial reporting.”165 
An important contribution of the new rules was to define the 
term “internal control over financial reporting” for purposes of 
section 404 compliance. The rules define the term as follows: 
A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Paragraph 4 is contained in Item 308 of Regulation S-K.  17 C.F.R. § 
229.308 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/ 
regsk.htm (last modified Nov. 19, 2003) (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
 165. Id. The Section 404 Release also effected certain technical amendments 
to the Exchange Act Rules in connection with the certifications required by 
sections 302 and 906.  See supra Section II.B.2.a. 
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registrant’s principal executive and principal financial 
officers, or persons performing similar functions, and 
effected by the registrant’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and includes those policies and 
procedures that: 
(1)  Pertain to the maintenance of records that in 
reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
registrant; 
(2)  Provide reasonable assurance that transactions 
are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and 
expenditures of the registrant are being made only in 
accordance with authorizations of management and 
directors of the registrant; and 
(3)  Provide reasonable assurance regarding 
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized 
acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant’s 
assets that could have a material effect on the 
financial statements.166 
The Section 404 Release spends a good deal of time on this 
definition, as it has been the subject of much writing in the 
accounting literature over the years.167 
Section 404’s requirements, particularly the auditor 
certification requirement, have been and will continue to be very 
challenging for public companies. In discussing section 404 and 
the SEC’s rulemaking pursuant to section 404, SEC Chairman 
William Donaldson stated: 
For many companies, the new rules on internal 
control reports will represent the most significant 
single requirement associated with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. The establishment and maintenance of 
internal control over financial reporting has always 
been an important responsibility of management 
 
 166. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13a-14(d) and 15d-14(d), 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.13a-15(f) (2003). 
 167. See generally Section 404 Release, supra note 161, § II(A). 
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. . . . By requiring a report stating management’s 
responsibility for internal control over financial 
reporting and management’s assessment regarding 
the effectiveness of such control, investors will be 
better able to evaluate management’s stewardship 
responsibilities and the reliability of a company’s 
disclosure.168 
d.  Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers 
Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires a public company to 
disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics for senior financial 
officers and to disclose in public filings if its code of ethics changes 
or if any waivers from the code are granted by the company. 169  
Section 406(c) defines the term “code of ethics” to mean: 
such standards as are reasonably necessary to promote— 
(1)  honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical 
 handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between 
 personal and professional relationships; 
(2)  full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure 
in the periodic reports required to be filed by the issuer; 
and 
(3)  compliance with applicable governmental rules and 
regulations.170 
On March 3, 2003, the SEC promulgated rules implementing 
section 406, along with its rules implementing section 407.171 In the 
Section 407 Release, the SEC extended the requirements of section 
406 to also include disclosure of whether a public company has 
adopted a code of ethics that applies to its principal executive 
officer.172  In addition, the SEC expanded on the definition of 
“code of ethics,” defining it as follows: 
[W]ritten standards that are reasonably designed to deter 
 
 168. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 16, at 19-20 (citation omitted). 
 169. Pub. L. No. 170-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7264). 
 170. “The problems surrounding Enron Corp. and other public companies 
raise concerns about the ethical standards of corporations and their senior 
financial managers. The Committee believes that investors have a legitimate 
interest in knowing whether a public company holds its financial officers to certain 
ethical standards in their financial dealings.” S. REP. NO. 107-205 at 32 (2002). 
 171. See Section 407 Release, supra note 127. 
 172. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2003).  See also Donaldson Testimony, supra note 16, 
at 17.  “Given the role of the CEO in setting the ‘tone at the top,’ the [SEC] also 
included a company’s principal executive officer in its final rules.”  Id. 
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wrongdoing and to promote: 
1.  Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical 
handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest 
between personal and professional relationships; 
2.   Avoidance of conflicts of interest, including disclosure 
to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code 
of any material transaction or relationship that reasonably 
could be expected to give rise to such a conflict; 
3.  Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable 
disclosure in reports and documents that a company files 
with, or submits to, the Commission and in other public 
communications made by the company; 
4.  Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules 
and regulations; 
5.  The prompt internal reporting to an appropriate 
person or persons identified in the code of violations of 
the code; and 
6.  Accountability for adherence to the code.173 
The NYSE enacted and extended section 406 of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the SEC’s rulemaking in section 303A of its Listed 
Company Manual.174 Section 303A requires NYSE companies to 
“adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for 
directors, officers and employees, and promptly disclose any 
waivers of the code for directors or executive officers.”175 The NYSE 
 
 173. Section 407 Release, supra note 127, § II(B)(2). The SEC resisted 
commenters’ suggestions to set forth additional ethical principles: “We continue 
to believe that ethics codes do, and should, vary from company to company and 
that decisions as to the specific provisions of the code, compliance procedures and 
disciplinary measures for ethical breaches are best left to the company.  Such an 
approach is consistent with our disclosure-based regulatory scheme.” Id. 
 174. See generally id. 
 175. New York Stock Exchange, Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, § 
303A(10) (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ 
finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last modified No. 15, 2003) (last visited Apr. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter NYSE Final Rules]. 
No code of business conduct and ethics can replace the thoughtful 
behavior of an ethical director, officer or employee. However, such a 
code can focus the board and management on areas of ethical risk, 
provide guidance to personnel to help them recognize and deal with 
ethical issues, provide mechanisms to report unethical conduct, and 
help to foster a culture of honesty and accountability . . . . This 
disclosure requirement should inhibit casual and perhaps questionable 
waivers, and should help assure that, when warranted, a waiver is 
accompanied by appropriate controls designed to protect the 
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stated that each company “may determine its own policies”176 but 
nevertheless provided a fairly extensive listing of important matters 
that the code of business conduct “should”177 address.  That list 
includes the following:178 conflicts of interest;179 corporate 
opportunities;180 confidentiality;181 fair dealing;182 protection and 
 
company . . . . Each code of business conduct and ethics must also 
contain compliance standards and procedures that will facilitate the 
effective operation of the code. These standards should ensure the 
prompt and consistent action against violations of the code. Each listed 
company’s website must include its code of business conduct and 
ethics. 
Id. § 303A(10) cmt. 
 176. Id. 
 177. NYSE Governance Release, supra note 48, § 303A(10) cmt. 
The NYSE advises readers that the words “must” and “should” have 
been chosen with care when used. The use of the word “must” 
indicates a standard or practice with which companies would be 
required to comply. The use of the word “should” indicates a standard 
or practice that the Exchange believes is appropriate for most if not all 
companies, but failure to employ or comply with such standard or 
practice will not constitute a violation of NYSE standards. 
Id. at n.5.  See also New York Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Rule 
Proposals, Amend. No. 2, File No. SR-NYSE-2002-33 (Oct. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.NYSE.com/pdfs/amend2-10-08-03.pdf (last modified Oct. 9, 2003) 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
 178. See supra note 48 § 303A(10) cmt. 
 179. Id. 
A “conflict of interest” occurs when an individual’s private interest 
interferes in any way—or even appears to interfere—with the interests 
of the corporation as a whole. A conflict situation can arise when an 
employee, officer or director takes actions or has interests that may 
make it difficult to perform his or her company work objectively and 
effectively. Conflicts of interest also arise when an employee, officer or 
director, or a member of his or her family, receives improper personal 
benefits as a result of his or her position in the company. Loans to, or 
guarantees of obligations of, such persons are of special concern. The 
company should have a policy prohibiting such conflicts of interest, 
and providing a means for employees, officers and directors to 
communicate potential conflicts to the company. 
Id. 
 180. Id. 
Employees, officers and directors should be prohibited from (a) taking 
for themselves personally opportunities that are discovered through 
the use of corporate property, information or position; (b) using 
corporate property, information, or position for personal gain; and (c) 
competing with the company. Employees, officers and directors owe a 
duty to the company to advance its legitimate interests when the 
opportunity to do so arises. 
Id. 
 181. Id.  “Confidential information includes all non-public information that 
might be of use to competitors, or harmful to the company or its customers, if 
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proper use of company assets;183 compliance with laws, rules, and 
regulations (including insider trading laws);184 and encouraging the 
reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior.185 
Stating that “[e]thical behavior is required and expected of 
every corporate director, officer and employee,”186 the Nasdaq 
proposed in October 2002, as amended by a filing published by the 
SEC on July 10, 2003,187 a new subsection (m) to NASD Rule 4350, 
as follows: 
Each Issuer shall adopt a code of conduct applicable to all 
directors, officers and employees, which shall be publicly 
available. A code of conduct satisfying this rule must 
comply with the definition of a “code of ethics” set out in 
Section 406(c) of [Sarbanes-Oxley] and any regulations 
promulgated thereunder by the [SEC]. In addition, the 
code must provide for an enforcement mechanism. Any 
 
disclosed.” Id. 
 182. Id. 
Each employee, officer and director should endeavor to deal fairly with 
the company’s customers, suppliers, competitors and employees. None 
should take unfair advantage of anyone through manipulation, 
concealment, abuse of privileged information, misrepresentation of 
material facts, or any other unfair-dealing practice. Companies may 
write their codes in a manner that does not alter existing legal rights 
and obligations of companies and their employees, such as “at will” 
employment arrangements. 
Id. 
 183. Id. “All employees, officers and directors should protect the company’s 
assets and ensure their efficient use. Theft, carelessness and waste have a direct 
impact on the company’s profitability. All company assets should be used for 
legitimate business purposes.” Id. 
 184. Id.  “Insider trading is both unethical and illegal, and should be dealt with 
decisively.” Id. 
 185. Id. 
The company should proactively promote ethical behavior. The 
company should encourage employees to talk to supervisors, managers 
or other appropriate personnel when in doubt about the best course of 
action in a particular situation. Additionally, employees should report 
violations of laws, rules, regulations or the code of business conduct to 
appropriate personnel. To encourage employees to report such 
violations, the company must ensure that employees know that the 
company will not allow retaliation for reports made in good faith. 
Id. 
 186. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
Inc. to Amend NASD Rule 4350 To Require Listed Companies To Adopt a Code 
of Conduct for All Directors, Officers, and Employees, Release No. 34-48125, 68 
Fed. Reg. 41,194, 41,194 (July 10, 2003). 
 187. Id. 
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waivers of the code for directors or executive officers must 
be approved by the Board and must be disclosed in the 
issuer’s public filings, not later than the next periodic 
report.188 
The Nasdaq also promulgated an interpretation under Rule 
4350(m), IM-4350-7, providing guidance for Rule 4350(m).189 In IM 
4350-7, the Nasdaq states: 
The requirement of a publicly available code of conduct 
applicable to all directors, officers and employees of an 
issuer is intended to demonstrate to investors that the 
board and management of Nasdaq issuers have carefully 
considered the requirement of ethical dealing and have 
put in place a system to ensure that they become aware of 
and take prompt action against any questionable 
behavior.190 
Given the concern that employees of public companies feel 
protected in enforcing ethical standards, the interpretation states 
that “[f]or company personnel, a code of conduct with 
enforcement provisions provides assurance that reporting of 
questionable behavior is protected and encouraged, and fosters an 
atmosphere of self-awareness and prudent conduct.”191 
Rule 4350(m) requires that Nasdaq companies comply with 
section 406(c) of Sarbanes-Oxley and, thus, “must include such 
standards as are reasonably necessary to promote the ethical 
handling of conflicts of interest, full and fair disclosure, and 
compliance with laws, rules and regulations.”192  However, Rule 
4350(m) also goes beyond the requirements of section 406(c), 
applying to all directors, officers, and employees. Companies can 
either address each requirement with one comprehensive code or 
two or more separate codes.193 
Finally, to give the code the necessary teeth, the interpretation 
states that “[e]ach code of conduct must also contain an 
enforcement mechanism that ensures prompt and consistent 
enforcement of the code, protection for persons reporting 
questionable behavior, clear and objective standards for 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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compliance, and a fair process by which to determine violations.”194 
e.  NYSE and Nasdaq Rules on Shareholder Approval of Equity 
Compensation Plans. 
The SEC approved new rules proposed by the NYSE and the 
Nasdaq requiring shareholder approval of Equity Compensation 
Plans of listed companies.195 The Equity Plan Release approved an 
amended new section 303A(8) of the NYSE’s listed Company 
Manual and an amended NASD Rule 4350(i).196  Although not 
required by Sarbanes-Oxley, these SRO provisions were clearly 
adopted as additional corporate governance rules evincing the 
spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The new NYSE rule provides that “[s]hareholders must be 
given the opportunity to vote on all equity-compensation plans and 
material revisions thereto, with limited exemptions . . . .”197  The 
rule defines an “equity-compensation plan” as one that “provides 
for the delivery of equity securities (either newly issued or treasury 
 
 194. Id. at 41,195. Part of the enforcement mechanism is contained in the 
requirement that companies disclose waivers of the code promptly. Id. 
 195. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving NYSE and 
Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes and Nasdaq Amendment No. 1 and Notice of 
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to NYSE Amendments No. 1 and 
2 and Nasdaq Amendments No. 2 and 3 Thereto Relating to Equity Compensation 
Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48108 (proposed June 20, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 
39,995, (July 3, 2003) [hereinafter Self-Regulatory Organizations Release]: 
The [SEC] has long encouraged exchanges to adopt and strengthen 
their corporate governance listing standards in order to, among other 
things, restore investor confidence in the national marketplace. The 
[SEC] believes that the NYSE proposal and the Nasdaq proposal, which 
require shareholder approval of equity compensation plans, are the 
first step under this directive because they should have the effect of 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders, while placing certain 
restrictions on their listed companies. 
Id. at 40,005. 
 196. Id. at 39,996, 39,999. 
 197. Id. at 39,997. See also NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 49, § 
303A(8): 
Equity-compensation plans can help align shareholder and 
management interests, and equity-based awards are often very 
important components of employee compensation. To provide checks 
and balances on the potential dilution resulting from the process of 
earmarking shares to be used for equity-based awards, the [NYSE] 
requires that all equity-compensation plans, and any material revisions 
to the terms of such plans, be subject to shareholder approval . . . . 
Id. 
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/12
JOHNSON SIDES-READY.DOC 5/20/2004  6:53 PM 
2004] SARBANES-OXLEY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES  1191 
shares) of the listed company to any employee, director or other 
service provider as compensation for services, including a 
compensatory grant of options or other equity securities that is not 
made under a plan.”198  The rule provides for certain exclusions 
from the definition of “equity-compensation plans” including 
“[p]lans that are made available to shareholders generally, such as 
a typical dividend reinvestment plan”199 and “[p]lans that merely 
allow employees, directors or other service providers to elect to buy 
shares on the open market or from the listed company for their 
current fair market value.”200 
Section 303A(8) defines “material revision” to include, for 
example, a material increase in the number of shares available 
under the plan (other than an increase solely to reflect a 
reorganization, stock split, merger, spinoff, or similar 
transaction);201 an expansion of the types of awards available under 
the plan;202 a material expansion of the class of employees, 
directors, or other service providers eligible to participate in the 
plan;203 a material expansion of the term of the plan;204 a material 
change to the method of determining the strike price of options 
under the plan;205 and the deletion or limitation of any provision 
prohibiting repricing of options.206  The rule exempts certain 
actions from the shareholder vote requirement, including 
“employment inducement awards,207 certain grants, plans and 
 
 198. Self-Regulatory Organizations Release, supra note 195, at 39,996. 
 199. Id. at 39,997. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
If a plan contains a formula for automatic increases in the shares 
available . . . or for automatic grants pursuant to a formula, each such 
increase or grant will be considered a revision requiring shareholder 
approval unless the plan has a term of not more than ten years . . . . If a 
plan contains no limit on the number of shares available and is not a 
formula plan, then each grant under the plan will require separate 
shareholder approval regardless of whether the plan has a term of not 
more than ten years. 
Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 39,997. 
 206. Id. at 39,998. 
 207. Id. “An employment inducement award is a grant of options or other 
equity-based compensation as a material inducement to a person or persons being 
hired by the listed company . . . . Inducement awards include grants to new 
employees in connection with a merger or acquisition.” Id. 
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amendments in the context of mergers and acquisitions,208 and 
certain specific types of plans209. . . .”  The new Nasdaq rule requires 
shareholder approval in the same instances, and exempt the same 
types of transactions, as those set forth in NYSE section 303A(8).210 
III. CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
States, not the federal government, traditionally have 
regulated corporate governance.211  In contrast to the statutory and 
regulatory mandate of Sarbanes-Oxley, state corporation statutes 
largely are enabling, not regulatory, in thrust.212  These statutes 
establish the basic architecture of corporate governance, but they 
have relatively little to say about the standards that directors and 
officers must adhere to or practices they must follow.  In the latter 
part of the twentieth century, many states (but not Delaware) 
codified a director standard of care,213 and many states (including 
 
 208. There are two exemptions in the context of mergers and acquisitions: (i) 
converting, replacing, or adjusting outstanding options to reflect the transaction 
and (ii) shares existing under certain pre-existing plans that were acquired. See id. 
 209. Certain tax-qualified plans are exempt under this provision, including 
plans intended to meet the requirements of section 401 under the Internal 
Revenue Code (ESOPs), plans intended to meet the requirements of section 423 
under the Internal Revenue Code (employee stock purchase plans), and “parallel 
excess plans.” Id. 
 210. See generally id. at 39,999. The Nasdaq also promulgated IM-4350-5, 
providing for interpretations under amended Rule 4350(i). See also id. at 40,008 
(which contains the SEC’s discussion of the proposals of both the NYSE and 
Nasdaq and “notes that the NYSE and Nasdaq proposals, while not identical, set a 
consistent, minimum standard for shareholder approval of equity compensation 
plans.”). 
 211. CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No 
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s 
authority to regulate domestic corporations . . . .”); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (holding there is no federal Rule 10b-5 cause of action for 
breach of corporate fiduciary duty without deception or manipulation).  See also 
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (vacating SEC rule 
prohibiting national securities exchanges and associations from listing the stock of 
companies violating a one-share, one-vote policy). 
 212. To be sure, corporate statutes contain mandatory provisions, but they are 
not strong constraints and often can be avoided by planning.  See e.g., Bernard S. 
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?  A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 
542 (1990); Elvin R. Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely “Enabling”?, 50 
CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965). 
 213. Forty states have enacted a statutory standard of care for directors. MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §  8.30 at 8-177 (3d ed. 1996) (2000/01/02 Supp.).  Delaware 
does have a statute permitting directors to rely on other persons in specified 
situations.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2003).  This statute, as to director 
reliance on professionals or experts, requires that such persons must have been 
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Delaware)214 enacted statutes partially addressing director conflict 
of interest transactions,215 but not addressing other aspects of the 
director duty of loyalty.  This statutory “silence” meant that, 
historically, standards for the proper discharge of corporate 
governance responsibilities come from non-legislative sources.  
These may be non-binding and aspirational in nature, as with the 
notion of corporate “best practices,”216 or legally binding, as with 
NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards217 and judge-made law. 
Courts have long recognized that corporate officers and 
directors are fiduciaries and that equity, not law, is the source of 
their fiduciary obligations.  As stated by former Delaware 
Chancellor William Allen: 
The duties [corporate officers and directors] owe to 
shareholders with respect to the exercise of their legal 
power over corporate property supervene their legal 
 
selected “with reasonable care . . . .”  If directors select these persons, therefore, 
directors must act with “reasonable care” in doing so, if they desire the right to 
rely on the professional or expert. 
 214. DEL. CODE ANN.  tit. 8, § 144 (2003). 
 215. These statutes address only “transactions” and, accordingly, they do not 
deal with usurpation of corporate opportunities, wrongful competition with a 
corporation, or appropriating confidential information—all matters implicating a 
director’s duty of loyalty.  Moreover, these statutes were designed to overcome the 
common law rule that such transactions were voidable; most such statutes do not 
affirmatively validate such transactions or immunize them from judicial review.  
Compare Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976), with Fisher v. State Mutual 
Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Georgia’s version of the 
Model Business Corporation Act’s conflict-of-interest transaction statute provides a 
“safe harbor” for upholding such transactions without judicial review for fairness). 
 216. Chief Justice Veasey has stated: 
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for boards 
of directors that go beyond minimal legal requirements of the 
corporation law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit 
stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help 
directors avoid liability.  But they are not required by the corporation 
law and do not define standards of liability. 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). 
 217. The NYSE and NASDAQ have a limited range of sanctions for 
noncompliance with listing standards.  They may suspend trading in a security or 
delist a company.  These are very rarely used, however, as they penalize investors 
and raise difficult practical problems.  See John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit 
Committees More Effective, 54 BUS. LAW. 1097, 1100 (1999).  See NYSE Governance 
Release, supra note 48, § 303A(13) discussed at supra note 89 and accompanying 
text.  See also SEC Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 
Fed. Reg. 2638-01 (proposed January 17, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts 228, 229, 240, 249, 
and 274 (2003) (proposing adoption of Rule 10A-3, which would prohibit the 
listing of securities of issuers not following the audit committee mandates of 
Sarbanes-Oxley) discussed supra notes 39 through 45 and accompanying text. 
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rights, are imposed by equity and are recognized and 
enforced exclusively by a court of equity. Chancery takes 
jurisdiction over “fiduciary” relationships because equity, 
not law, is the source of the right asserted.218 
The vocabulary of equity is not legal rules; indeed, from the 
outset the function of equity has been to correct the unfairness 
caused by too rigidly adhering to a universal, rules-based approach 
to justice.219  Consequently, equity—although still susceptible to the 
lure of precision offered by rules220—largely approaches the 
obligations of directors and officers through the use of duties and 
standards.  Duties and standards often are more cogent than rules 
while also being more open-textured, fluid, and context-sensitive.  
This is evident in corporate law, where the duties are broad and 
usefully ill-defined—decision-makers must act with “loyalty” and 
“care” and in “good faith,” but are accorded wide latitude in 
discharging their governance responsibilities in conformance with 
these standards.  This is highly functional in corporate law given 
the strong “process” dimension to fiduciary analysis.221  A “process” 
approach  to judicial review avoids both overly strict substantive 
review and specification of rules of behavior, focusing instead on 
assessing whether the manner in which directors acted in a 
particular setting conforms to evolving understandings of broad 
standards.222 
At the same time, such imprecision necessarily accords both 
 
 218. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A. 2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) 
(citations omitted). 
 219. See MARGARET HALLIWELL, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE IN A 
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 6 (1997) (“Fundamental misconceptions of equity 
abound . . . because of a persistent refusal to acknowledge that equity is, by its very 
nature, subversive of the law.”). 
 220. For example, corporate law has developed a business judgment “rule” and 
conflict of interest “rules.”  These “rules” are an attempt to give more specific 
content to fiduciary duties and to give ex ante guidance to corporate planners.  
They do not fully capture the reach of more open-ended and pervasive fiduciary 
duties, however.  See Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness 
and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 760 & nn.65, 68 (1978). 
 221. Although a process focus is especially important in the duty-of-care area, 
see infra  notes 230-31 and accompanying text, it is also important in the loyalty and 
good faith areas.  See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text. 
 222. Recently, two scholars have argued that good corporate governance 
practices require moving beyond a focus on “structural” considerations—e.g., 
whether directors are independent, the number of directors, etc.—to a greater 
focus on the “process” attributes of greater board effectiveness.  Sydney Finkelstein 
and Ann C. Mooney, Not the Usual Suspects: How to Use Board Process to Make Boards 
Better, 17 ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE 101 (2003). 
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directors and judges more interpretive discretion than do rules, a 
feature some applaud and others decry.223  For example, a traffic 
safety rule might specify in clear detail what conduct is required in 
operating a motor vehicle, while a traffic standard might simply 
mandate that one drive “safely” under all circumstances, leaving it 
to drivers and judges to construe that standard over time.  Likewise, 
in corporate law, the notions of “care” and “loyalty” and “fairness” 
have been given meaning in a wide variety of contexts through 
decades of case-by-case adjudication.  This allows a more probing 
and “tailored” legal response to a particular claim while also 
leading, over time, to a rich body of incremental changes in 
corporate law as a whole. 
The legal regulation of corporate governance practices, 
therefore, traditionally has been the work of judges using the tools 
of equity—duties and standards—and not the work of legislatures 
and administrative agencies enacting detailed statutes, rules, and 
regulations.  The latter have been predominant in federal securities 
regulation, but not in corporate governance.  As seen in Part II of 
this article, Sarbanes-Oxley—housed in the federal securities law—
not only represents a new federal presence in corporate 
governance,224 it adopts a wholly novel, rules-based approach to 
corporate governance.  Moreover, the federal intervention is not 
pervasive but is partial and selective, and it provides no built-in 
interpretive, adjudicative, or enforcement mechanisms accessible 
to shareholders.  Growth in the law, through interpretation, largely 
will come at the urging of the SEC rather than shareholders.  
 
 223. If one goal of judicial review is to encourage a dynamic approach to 
board practice, such that change and new thinking are encouraged, standards are 
superior to rules, the latter running the risk of “freezing” current practice.  But see 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) 
(arguing that rules are better than standards in constraining judges). 
 224. Sarbanes-Oxley represents a federal presence in corporate law quite 
different in the particulars, but similar overall in aim, to Professor William Cary’s 
proposal thirty years ago for a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act.  William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 
(1974).  For two insightful treatments of federal law, state law, and listing 
standards—taken together—as forming a new, collaborative “tri-partite” approach 
to corporate governance, see William B. Chandler III and Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of 
Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (cited in Letter from 
the State of Wisconsin Investment Board to SEC Secretary Jonathan Katz, (June 
12, 2003)), available at http://www.swib.state.wi.us/rule.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 
2004); Robert B. Thompson, Colloborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, 
State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003). 
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Overall, Sarbanes-Oxley simply is not a comprehensive, systematic 
approach to corporate governance, as is the case with state 
corporate law.  This contrast in federal and state approaches to 
corporate regulation can easily be seen by reviewing Delaware’s 
judicial treatment of director and officer fiduciary duties. 
We first briefly describe the traditional duties of corporate 
directors,225 highlighting recent renewed emphasis on the 
obligation of good faith.  Next, we describe the neglected status of 
corporate officers as agents owing robust fiduciary duties. 
A.  Director Fiduciary Duties 
On several occasions, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated 
that corporate directors owe “fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and 
good faith.”226  However, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, upon closely 
examining supreme court language, concluded that the obligation 
of good faith, although a fiduciary requirement, is, in fact, an 
aspect of the duty of loyalty. 227  Recently, Chief Justice Veasey, 
citing both corporate statues and decisional law, reiterated the 
distinctive place of good faith in fiduciary analysis: “[I]t seems that 
there is a separate duty of good faith, not only arising out of our 
case law, but also as a matter of statutory construction.”228  Later in 
the same article, he softened this observation a bit, stating: 
“Because the jurisprudence on good faith is unresolved, I express 
no opinion whether or when a separate duty of good faith that is 
not subsumed in the duty of loyalty should apply upon court 
review.”229  As will be seen later, the effort to more sharply 
differentiate good faith, or at least give it greater prominence in 
 
 225. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate 
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) (providing a recent and more complete 
treatment of director fiduciary duties under Delaware law) [hereinafter After 
Enron]; Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 787 (1999) [hereinafter Rethinking Care]. 
 226. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998); Cinerama, Inc. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
 227. In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 n.41 
(Del. Ch. 2000). 
 228. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the 
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 447 (2003) [hereinafter 
State-Federal Tension].  See also Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive 
Compensation?, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 1, Jan. 2003, at 68, 76; E. Norman Veasey, 
Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom Environment, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 839, 850 (2003). 
 229. State-Federal Tension, supra note 228, at 448. 
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fiduciary analysis, may pave the way in translating the mandates of 
Sarbanes-Oxley into state fiduciary analysis.  For now, whether the 
obligation of good faith is subsumed within the duty of loyalty is 
less important than the fact that there is a director obligation of 
good faith, and that it has several facets. 
1.  Duty of Due Care 
The duty of due care specifies the manner in which directors 
must discharge their legal responsibilities.  These responsibilities 
include electing, evaluating, and compensating corporate officers; 
reviewing and approving corporate strategy, budgets, and capital 
expenditures; monitoring internal financial information systems 
and financial reporting obligations, and complying with legal 
requirements; making distributions to shareholders; approving 
transactions not in the ordinary course of business; appointing 
members to committees and discharging committee assignments, 
including the important audit, compensation and nominating 
committees; and initiating changes to the certificate of 
incorporation and bylaws. 
The duty of due care arises in both the discrete decision-
making context and in the oversight and monitoring areas.  In the 
decision-making setting—whether it involves directors making a 
routine business decision or responding to a high-stakes unsolicited 
bid for corporate control—the duty of care inquiry clearly focuses 
on a board’s “decision-making process.”230  Directors in that setting 
are under an obligation to obtain and act with due care on all 
material information reasonably available.231  The most famous case 
involving breach of the duty of care in the decision-making context 
is Smith v. Van Gorkom,232 where directors were held to have been 
grossly negligent in discharging that facet of the duty of due care 
requiring them to be fully informed before making a business 
decision.233  After the Van Gorkom decision, however, Delaware 
amended its corporation statute to permit an amendment to a 
company’s certificate of incorporation either to limit or eliminate 
 
 230. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 
1989); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the 
decisionmaking context is process due care only.”). 
 231. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 
48 (Del. 1994). 
 232. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 233. Id. at 893. 
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director liability for breaches of the duty of due care.234  The vast 
majority of public companies in Delaware have adopted an 
exculpation provision eliminating director liability in this way.235 
Directors also may be liable for breach of the duty of care if 
they fail to properly monitor and oversee the business affairs of a 
corporation.  The Delaware Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
whether negligence or gross negligence is the proper standard of 
conduct in the oversight context, as opposed to the business 
judgment context.236  As famously noted by Chancellor Allen, this 
monitoring and oversight obligation “includes a duty to attempt in 
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting 
system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that 
failure to do so under some circumstances may . . . render a 
director liable.”237  Importantly, however, noted Chancellor Allen’s 
dictum, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish 
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”238 
If one focuses on certain language—“sustained or systematic 
failure” or “utter failure”—the Caremark standard of care for 
directors in the oversight context seems very low.  The difficulties 
associated with this view can be seen in Chancellor Chandler’s 
illustration, discussed in an extended footnote, of what he called 
“the problem of assessing claims, based on accounting regularities, 
under the Caremark standard.”239  Often overlooked, however, in 
reading Caremark are repeated references to a director’s “obligation 
to be reasonably informed”240 and the duty “to exercise reasonable 
oversight,”241 as well as the statement that directors must act to 
“assure a reasonable information and reporting system.”242  Thus, 
director failure to act reasonably in the oversight area may allow an 
 
 234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §102 (b)(7) (2003). 
 235. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and 
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209-10 (1988). 
 236. See Rethinking Care, supra note 225, at 815-16 & nn.162-64. 
 237. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 238. Id. at 971. 
 239. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *15 n.57 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
15, 2000).  See also Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 599 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(rejecting shareholder claim under Caremark standard). 
 240. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 241. Id. at 971. 
 242. Id. 
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inference of bad faith or, more likely, such inaction may constitute 
a breach of that facet of due care requiring directors to be 
“reasonably informed.”243  What it means to be “reasonably 
informed” is different in corporate law today—after Sarbanes-
Oxley—than in 1996, before Congress mandated adoption of 
certain governance reforms, including internal processes aimed at 
providing “reasonable assurance” regarding the reliability of 
corporate information.244  In Caremark, Chancellor Allen noted the 
relevance of federal law—in that case, federal organizational 
sentencing guidelines245—to understanding director governance 
responsibilities under state law.  Likewise, Sarbanes-Oxley may 
infuse new meaning into our notions of “reasonable” oversight in a 
way that leads courts to demand greater director vigilance under 
the “reasonableness” standard of Caremark.246 
Other director oversight responsibilities with a due care 
dimension include the duty to monitor a corporation’s compliance 
with various regulatory regimes governing its activities.247  Perceived 
breakdowns in director monitoring of corporate accounting 
systems and company compliance with various regulatory regimes 
and internal control practices led to many of the corporate 
scandals such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and others.  
Consequently, as noted in Part II,  Sarbanes-Oxley includes several 
provisions aimed at bolstering director discharge of oversight 
responsibilities.248 
 
 243. Id. at 970. 
 244. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.  Corporate law, of course, 
is influenced by wider social norms: “[C]orporation law exists, not as an isolated 
body of rules and principles, but rather in a historical setting and as part of a 
larger body of law premised upon shared values.” City Capitol Assocs. Ltd.  P’ship 
v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799 (Del. Ch. 1988) appeal dismissed without opinion, 
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).  It is fair to say that today it is a “shared value” that 
corporate directors must be more zealous in discharging their oversight 
responsibilities.  Corporation law should reflect this value through its handling of 
fiduciary duties. 
 245. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 246. Chief Justice Veasey tersely conveys the same idea—that federal law may 
alter state fiduciary standards—through his phrase “evolving standards of director 
conduct, [and] the minimum expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley . . . .” State-Federal 
Tension, supra note 228, at 446. 
 247. See Lyman Johnson, Misunderstanding Director Duties: The Strange Case of 
Virginia, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127, 1138-40 & nn.51-58 (1999) (enumerating 
various regulatory regimes).  See also John J. Fons, The Case for Compliance: Now It’s a 
Necessity, not an Option, 13 BUS. LAW TODAY 1,  Sept./Oct. 2003, at 27. 
 248. See supra Part II(B)(1). 
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2.  Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the best interest 
of the corporation.  The duty of loyalty has a well-recognized 
dimension prohibiting a director from preferring his or her own 
interests over the interests of the corporation.  Accordingly, a 
director may not engage in an unfair self-dealing (“conflict of 
interest”) transaction, wrongly usurp a corporate opportunity, 
improperly compete with the corporation, or use corporate assets 
or confidential company information for personal gain.  Mere 
absence of a personal, conflicting interest by a director, however, is 
insufficient, by itself, to fulfill the affirmative aspect of the duty of 
loyalty.249  The Delaware Chancery Court has observed that a breach 
of loyalty can be unintended and can occur even when board 
action is taken in good faith, and even where self-interest is 
absent.250  As the chancery court has noted, “a fiduciary may act 
disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal pecuniary 
interest; and . . . regardless of his motive, a director who 
consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and its 
stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary 
damages for any harm he causes.”251 
3.  Good faith 
The obligation of good faith has long been important to 
fiduciary analysis in corporate law, but its meaning has been 
somewhat nebulous.  A recent statement by Chief Justice Veasey 
helps in understanding the breadth of this concept: 
It is all about process, and process is all about due care 
and good faith, as well as loyalty.  In my opinion, good 
faith requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a 
disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for 
the corporate good, but not caring for the well-being of 
the constituents of the fiduciary.  Although the concept of 
 
 249. For an elaboration of the dual aspects of the duty of loyalty, see After 
Enron, supra note 225, at 37-42. 
 250. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); accord 
State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000), reargument denied, 2001 WL 32639 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2001). 
 251. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000). See also Hoover 
Indus., Inc. v. Chase, 1988 WL 73758, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 13, 1988) (“A director 
does breach his duty of loyalty if he knows that the company has been defrauded 
and does not report what he knows to the board . . . .”). 
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good faith is not fully developed in the case law, and 
factual scenarios are difficult to formulate, an argument 
could be made that reckless, disingenuous, irresponsible, 
or irrational conduct—but not necessarily self-dealing or 
larcenous conduct—could implicate concepts of good 
faith.  If the board’s decision or conduct is irrational or so 
beyond reason that no reasonable director would credit 
the decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some 
circumstances, be inferred.252 
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine also has commented on how the 
notion of good faith may play a more prominent role in fiduciary 
analysis: “Enron might exert pressure on courts to look more 
carefully at whether directors have made a good faith effort to 
accomplish their duties.”253  Asserting that good faith goes to 
director “state of mind,”254 Strine identifies certain kinds of director 
conduct that may call good faith into question.  These include “a 
failure to monitor if their [directors’] laxity in oversight was so 
persistent and substantial that it evidences bad faith.”255  It can also 
arise in situations where “committee members knew that their 
inadequate knowledge disabled them from discharging their 
responsibilities with fidelity . . . . [Here,] the court will be called on 
to conclude that a director who is conscious  that he is not devoting 
sufficient attention to his duties is not acting in good faith . . . .”256  
Finally, where 
an overly busy person on the board of five public 
companies . . . takes on challenging duties on each of 
these boards, and then finds himself in a situation where 
one of his companies is accused of serious wrongdoing 
that the board arguably should have prevented, he should 
not be surprised if his good faith comes under severe 
attack in the financial press and in the courts.257 
These publicly expressed judicial views on the importance of 
good faith serve an important “signaling” function in corporate 
law.  The signal is aimed, first, at the SEC, which has been engaged 
 
 252. State-Federal Tension, supra note 228, at 447.  For a more extensive 
treatment of good faith, see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 456 (2004). 
 253. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation 
Law Implications of the Enron Debacle. 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1373 (2002). 
 254. Id. at 1386. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 1393 (emphasis in original). 
 257. Id. at 1395. 
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in monumental rule-making under the auspices of Sarbanes-Oxley.  
These highly respected judges sought to convey the message that 
Delaware judges are fully aware of corporate misconduct and its 
pernicious effects on our corporate law system, and that Delaware 
judges intend to creatively deploy their arsenal of doctrinal 
concepts to reinvigorate their assessment of corporate decision-
makers.  This amounts to a “pledge” of action, designed, in part, to 
reassure the SEC that the traditional makers of corporate law are 
attending to the problem.258  No doubt, they hope to preserve 
Delaware’s central role in corporate jurisprudence by forestalling 
further congressional action and possibly curbing the most 
expansive reading of the SEC’s mandate to regulate under 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  The judicial signal also is aimed at the corporate 
bar, both practicing and academic, who have been critical members 
in the interpretive community of corporate law.  By speaking and 
writing to practitioners, Delaware’s judges can upgrade boardroom 
conduct by announcing that judicial eyebrows are raised, and that 
they intend to vigilantly examine director conduct.  The 
audience—corporate lawyers—will, in turn, assimilate and re-
broadcast these judicial views, along with commentary, to other 
lawyers through print media259  and seminars.  These lawyers in 
turn will distill and convey these sentiments to clients, through 
letters, memoranda, and advice.  The result of this exhortation—
obvious across corporate America in the past year or two—is 
heightened attention to reform of corporate governance practices. 
To be credible, these judicial admonitions must find 
expression in case law.  This has recently occurred, in both the 
decision-making and oversight contexts.  In denying a motion to 
dismiss a shareholder complaint, Chancellor Chandler shed new 
light on the meaning of the director good faith obligation.260  The 
chancellor noted that the complaint did much more than portray 
directors who were grossly negligent; rather, it suggested that “the 
defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their 
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude 
 
 258. Chief Justice Veasey clearly has undertaken this task.  He states that “one 
can foresee a major role for state courts . . . in continuing to set a positive tone for 
best practices in Corporate America . . . .”  State-Federal Tension,  supra note 228, at 
444.  He then goes on to discuss “good faith” as a promising doctrinal notion, 
describing it as an “area where the common law approach of the Delaware law of 
fiduciary duty is progressing.” Id. 
 259. See, e.g., the articles collected supra note 8. 
 260. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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concerning a material corporate decision.”261  He stated that such 
“deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act 
faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not 
have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best 
interest of the company.”262  In other words, deliberate indifference 
to the director duties of care and loyalty, or consciously 
disregarding those duties, is conduct sufficiently faulty to indicate a 
lack of the required motive—i.e. good faith—of advancing the best 
interest of the company.  The court, in assessing director behavior, 
is not substantively evaluating conduct, but is drawing an inference 
about the propriety of director motive from the nature of the 
conduct.  This allows the court an indirect way to do what the 
business judgment rule precludes—consider the substance of 
director conduct; not to assess it outright, but to draw an inference 
of bad motive if it is sufficiently egregious.263 
A recent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision applying 
Illinois law found a lack of director good faith in the oversight 
context where directors had made a conscious decision.264  Plaintiffs 
did not allege, as in Caremark, that the corporation’s reporting 
system was inadequate.265  Rather, plaintiffs alleged that directors 
knew of the company’s ongoing violations of federal law and yet 
consciously decided to take no steps in an effort to prevent or 
remedy the situation, with the result that the corporation incurred 
substantial losses.266  Relying both on Caremark267 and a Sixth Circuit 
decision for guidance as to what sort of director failings indicate 
lack of good faith in the oversight context,268 the court ruled that 
reckless disregard of a known risk is not conduct undertaken in 
good faith, for purposes of demand futility in shareholder 
 
 261. Id. at 289. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (noting 
that a business decision may be “so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment 
that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith” (quoting 
In re  J.P. Stevens & Co. Inc. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 
1988)).  Judge Friendly appears to be the first proponent of the view that the 
rationality of a decision is pertinent to the issue of good faith.  Sam Wong & Son, 
Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 671, 678 & n.32 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 264. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 265. Id. at 806. 
 266. Id. at 809. 
 267. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 268. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d. 808 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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derivative litigation.269  Consequently, given that claims against the 
directors implicated good faith and not just due care, directors 
were not exculpated from personal liability under the company’s 
articles of incorporation.270 
These authorities reveal a marked change in judicial attitude 
toward the analysis of fiduciary duty claims against directors.  Given 
the widespread exculpation from liability for breaching the duty of 
due care, renewed emphasis on good faith serves to reintroduce 
the specter of director liability through a new doctrinal vessel.  
Judicial exhortation of the kind provided by Chief Justice Veasey 
and Vice Chancellor Strine, coupled with decisions denying 
motions to dismiss and a recent decision awarding damages against 
directors,271 can remind directors that personal liability remains a 
distinct possibility for faulty performance, with the expectation that 
such reminders will induce better performance.  These authorities 
also suggest that the key issue with respect to analyzing good faith is 
whether the directors’ motivation and purpose was to advance the 
corporation’s interest.  The absence of proper motivation can be 
inferred in a variety of ways.  These include, to recapitulate: 
approval of a substantively irrational course of conduct; acting with 
deliberate indifference to known risks; reckless failure to disclose;272 
seeking entrenchment of director positions; acting with an 
awareness that as directors they are not fully discharging their 
fiduciary responsibilities, as by deliberately acting without sufficient 
knowledge, hastily, or in a manner that fails to devote sufficient 
attention to those responsibilities; and egregious process failures 
that suggest lack of concern for advancing corporate interests. 
Another indicator of director bad faith, often forgotten, is 
conduct known to constitute a violation of applicable positive law.  
For example, in a well-known case where directors failed to collect 
a $1.5 million debt owed to a company by the Democratic National 
Committee that shareholders alleged constituted an illegal 
campaign contribution, such director conduct, being itself a 
violation of a federal statute, was held to breach the obligation of 
 
 269. Abbot Labs., 325 F.3d at 809. 
 270. Id. at 810-11.  See also Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding directors of closely held Delaware corporation liable for breaching duties 
of loyalty and due care because they failed to halt self-dealing conduct by the 
CEO). 
 271. Pereira, 294 B.R. at 449. 
 272. See Johnson v. Shapiro, No. 17,651 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2002), reprinted in 28 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 237, 361 (2003). 
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good faith.273 
Delaware’s exculpation statute contains an exception for acts 
or omissions that involve a knowing violation of law as well as an 
exception for acts or omissions not in good faith.274  Consequently, 
a director who knowingly violates the law or who allows the 
corporation to violate the law—such as applicable provisions of 
Sarbanes-Oxley—is not entitled to exculpation, whether or not 
such conduct also constitutes a breach of the obligation of good 
faith.  Nonetheless, for two reasons, it is significant that knowing 
violations of a statute such as Sarbanes-Oxley may independently 
constitute breach of good faith.  First, Delaware’s statute allowing 
director reliance on corporate officers, committees of other 
directors, and professional advisers requires that the director act in 
good faith.275  A director who has knowledge of illegality as to a 
particular matter will not be acting in good faith in relying on 
another person as to that matter.  Second, Delaware’s 
indemnification statute requires that a director or officer must have 
acted in good faith.276  Knowledge of illegality precludes good faith.  
Thus, a director who acts while knowing the conduct is unlawful 
falls outside the coverage of these two important statutes. 
B.  Officer Fiduciary Duties 
Although often overlooked, corporate officers, including 
senior officers such as the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief 
Financial Officer, Chief Technology Officer, General Counsel, 
Executive Vice Presidents, the Treasurer, the Secretary, and 
others277 are “agents” of the corporation.  Agency is a fiduciary 
 
 273. Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3rd Cir. 1974) (holding 
business judgment rule inapplicable where directors’ decision was itself illegal); 
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996); In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). See S. 
Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 129-30 
(1979) (“Bad faith may preclude the application of the business judgment defense 
where directors knowlingly [sic] violate a statute or comparable expression of 
public policy, even if such a violation is undertaken in the corporation’s best 
interests.”). 
 274. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003). 
 275. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2003); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
261-62 (Del. 2000). 
 276. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2003). 
 277. SEC Rule 3b-7 defines “executive officer” to include, among others, any 
person or officer who performs a policymaking function. 
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relationship.278  Even though senior officers of corporations 
typically have employment agreements, they still occupy a fiduciary 
status in relation to the corporate principal.  As fiduciaries, officers 
owe several duties to the corporation that exist independently of 
contract—although they may, to a degree, be altered by agreement.  
Breach of these duties affords the corporate principal a host of 
remedies, including a tort action against the agent for losses caused 
by the breach.279 
One cornerstone fiduciary duty owed by officers is a duty of 
loyalty, which requires the agent to act solely for the benefit of the 
corporate principal.280  There are many aspects to the agent’s duty 
of loyalty.  These include: not acting adversely to the principal 
without consent281or on behalf of one with interests adverse to the 
principal without consent,282 not competing with the principal,283 
providing an accounting to the principal for profits,284 and not 
using or wrongly communicating confidential information.285  
Besides owing a duty of loyalty, officers owe a duty of ordinary 
care286 and, consequently, simple negligence is a breach of this 
duty.  Additional important duties include a duty of good 
conduct,287 a duty to provide information,288 and a duty to obey the 
principal,289 among others.290 
The agency status of officers seems to have been more 
significant to the issue of whether, in a particular case, officers had 
the power to affect the corporation’s relationship with third parties 
than to the issue of the fiduciary duties owed by officers, as agents, 
 
 278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
 279. Id. § 399. 
 280. Id. § 387. 
 281. Id. §§ 389-90. 
 282. Id. §§ 391-92, 394. 
 283. Id. § 393. 
 284. Id. § 388. 
 285. Id. §§ 395-96. 
 286. Id. § 379. 
 287. Id. § 380. 
 288. Id. § 381.  In a recent case, a de facto CFO and the corporation’s general 
counsel were held liable for not informing the board of directors that the CEO 
was taking unauthorized loans at favorable interest rates.  Pereira v. Cogan, 294 
B.R. 449, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  It is unclear from the opinion whether the 
general counsel was held liable in his capacity as an officer or as a lawyer. 
 289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958). 
 290. For a good, recent explanation of an agent’s fiduciary duties, see DANIEL 
S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 
117-28 (2002). 
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to the corporate principal.  Relatively little litigation asserting 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against officers has been brought 
either by boards of directors or, derivatively, by shareholders.  As 
stated by a leading Delaware corporate law treatise: “Few 
authorities deal with the nature of the obligation owed by officers 
to the corporation and its stockholders.”291  The foundational duty 
of loyalty case in Delaware,292 for example, groups officers and 
directors together when discussing fiduciary obligations,293 instead 
of distinguishing the differing conceptual bases for imposing 
fiduciary duties on officers and directors.294 
There may be several reasons for this dearth of attention to the 
distinctive status of corporate officers as fiduciaries.295  First, boards 
of directors may deal with officer misconduct by contractual means.  
That is, boards may negotiate settlements with officers as part of an 
infracorporate sanction, whether that sanction be discharge, 
 
 291. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.17 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).  See A. 
GILCHRIST SPARKS AND LAWRENCE A. HAMERMESH, Common Law Duties of Non-Director 
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992) (stating “The precise nature of the 
duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a topic that has 
received little attention from courts and commentators.”).  See also Cheryl L. Wade, 
Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
767, 770 (2002) (“I conclude that courts and attorneys should distinguish analysis 
of the duty of care owed by corporate executives or managers from the duty of 
care owed by directors.”). 
 292. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
 293. Id.  (stating “[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use 
their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.”). 
 294. The Delaware Supreme Court has, however, properly applied agency 
principles as the legal basis for imposing duties on non-officer employees.  See Sci. 
Accessories Corp. v.  Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980). 
 295. This is not to say that there are no decisions holding officers liable for 
breach of fiduciary duty.  There are several, though fewer than one might expect. 
See SPARKS & HAMERMESH, supra note 291, at 216-20 (collecting cases); Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).  What is puzzling is the dearth 
of decisional law squarely grounding liability on agency law or acknowledging that 
it is the officer’s status as an agent that carries with it—for sound economic and 
policy reasons—strong fiduciary duties.  The lack of conceptual clarity as to the 
rationale for officer liability was true in Justice Holmes’ famous 1919 opinion 
holding a bank president liable for mismanagement, Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 
(1920), and remains true in 2003, as seen by a recent federal court decision 
holding a chief executive officer personally liable for losses associated with putting 
his daughter on the corporate payroll and allowing her to use corporate property.  
Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 539 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).  These cases are rightly 
decided and the Bates case is rich in facts supporting liability, but both lack a 
clearly articulated theoretical and doctrinal underpinning. 
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reprimand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or delayed 
promotion.  This resolution probably entails the release of all 
claims, whatever the underlying legal theory.  Second, until January 
1, 2004, the Delaware Chancery Court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over officers as such.296  Accordingly, legal action 
against officers who were not also directors could not—absent 
other jurisdictional means—be brought in the Chancery Court.  
Third, lawyers for shareholders, and perhaps lawyers for boards of 
directors, simply may not appreciate the distinctive fiduciary 
obligations owed by officers to the corporation as agents, 
obligations existing in addition to those created expressly by 
contract.  Fourth, the overly “cozy” relationship between boards of 
directors and senior officers that has been the subject of much 
recent criticism may result in a corporate culture where directors 
do not regard officers as persons owing high fiduciary duties to the 
corporation.  Instead, they may feel indebted to the officer or 
believe it is their responsibility to support senior officers.  Indeed, 
they may still regard those officers, especially a Chief Executive 
Officer, as “the boss,”297 rather than, as is the case legally, an agent 
owing fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, whose 
institutional interests the directors are under their own distinct 
fiduciary duty to protect.298 
 
 296. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2003). 
 297. As Daniel Kleinberger puts it, “the agent may be the ‘star’ and the 
principal merely the supporting context.  Consider, for example, Itzhak Perlman 
serving for a season as first violinist of a metropolitan orchestra or Barry Bonds 
playing baseball for the San Francisco Giants.”  KLEINBERGER, supra note 290, at 17 
n.2.  To those names could be added the names of many high-profile, assertive 
corporate CEOs. 
 298. Vice Chancellor Strine, addressing a different legal issue, recently 
described more generally how the social dynamic for corporate directors may 
inhibit them from fully discharging their responsibilities: 
Nor should our law ignore the social nature of humans.  To be direct, 
corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed 
in social institutions.  Such institutions have norms, expectations that, 
explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the behavior of those 
who participate in their operation.  Some things are “just not done,” or 
only at a cost, which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but 
may involve a loss of standing in the institution.  In being appropriately 
sensitive to this factor, our law also cannot assume—absent some proof 
of the point—that corporate directors are, as a general matter, persons 
of unusual social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that 
social norms generate for ordinary folk. 
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
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IV.  THE INTERPLAY OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
AND STATE FIDUCIARY DUTY LAW 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandates do not represent a systematic 
approach to corporate governance.  Rather, they operate in a 
piecemeal fashion on a wide variety of subjects, sometimes aiming 
at the board of director level and sometimes centering on senior 
officers.  The new federal rules largely accept as given state law’s 
structural allocation of decision-making responsibility within 
corporations.  That is to say, Sarbanes-Oxley does not dramatically 
revise the traditional spheres of responsibility as between 
shareholders, directors, and officers.  In certain areas, however, as 
described in Part II, Sarbanes-Oxley specifies both structural 
change within these spheres and alters the way boards and officers 
must operate.  We begin by identifying how those particular federal 
mandates described in Part II bear specifically on director fiduciary 
duties.  We then turn to how officer fiduciary duties might be 
altered by the new federal rules.  Before doing so, however, we 
offer a few observations on the key constitutional issue raised by 
Sarbanes-Oxley in relation to state corporate law, the issue of 
preemption. 
Congress, of course, has the power to preempt state law.299  
Even without express preemption, state law must yield where 
Congress intends federal law to “occupy the field” and where state 
law conflicts with federal law.300  Such conflict will be found where it 
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law,301 and 
where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”302 
There is no constitutional reason why state corporate law, 
including judge-made law pertaining to fiduciary duties, as well as 
corporate statutes,303 could not be preempted.  Congress did not do 
so expressly in Sarbanes-Oxley.  Commentators, however, have 
raised the issue of whether Sarbanes-Oxley impliedly preempts 
 
 299. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963). 
 302. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.  See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 
(1941). 
 303. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State 
Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 349-52 (1989) (arguing that  
the issue of federal law preemption of state corporate law must address state judge-
made law as well as state corporate statutes). 
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certain aspects of state corporate law.304  Professors Thompson and 
Sale argue that Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a new federal fiduciary duty 
of care,305 while Chief Justice Veasey worries that Sarbanes-Oxley 
and SEC rules “may trump Delaware fiduciary law.”306   
We do not address the preemptive effect of all of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s provisions, only certain of those identified in Part II as 
having special significance for the state law of fiduciary duties.  In 
general, we see Sarbanes-Oxley as having only limited preemptive 
effect, though it will have considerable influence on state law 
fiduciary analysis.  The Supreme Court has set a high standard for 
preemption of a common law principle, such as judge-made 
fiduciary duty standards: “In order to abrogate a common-law 
principle, the [federal] statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question 
addressed by the common law.”307  We see no congressional intent 
to “occupy the field” and only a few instances where it is impossible 
to comply with both federal and state law or where state law stands 
as an obstacle to federal law purposes.  As to the governance 
mandates of the NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards, courts view 
listing standards as a private contract between the listed company 
and the exchange, and hold that shareholders have no rights under 
them.308 As such, the rules do not displace state fiduciary standards.  
Consequently, fiduciary duty will largely remain a state law and not 
a federal law matter. 
A.  Sarbanes-Oxley and Director Duties 
1.  Duty of Loyalty 
Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley wholly preempts portions of 
state law governing loans to directors and senior officers of 
 
 304. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for 
Officer, Lawyer and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 897, 938 (2002); 
Bainbridge, supra note 8. 
 305. Thompson & Sale, supra note 8, at 877-78.  Professors Thompson and Sale 
do not address the preemptive effect, if any, of this new federal duty on existing 
state law duties.  As will be seen, we reject the position of Professors Thompson 
and Sale.  See infra note 369 and accompanying text. 
 306. State-Federal Tension, supra note 228, at 443. 
 307. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (citations omitted); 
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (citing id.).  See Burks v. Lasker, 
441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979). 
 308. See John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 
BUS. LAW. 1097, 1100 n.15 (1999) (collecting cases). 
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reporting companies, and partially preempts state law dealing with 
compensation of the chief executive officer and the chief financial 
officer.  Sarbanes-Oxley also is likely to be highly influential in 
causing a rethinking of state law’s definition of an “independent” 
director, an issue that pervades state fiduciary duty law. 
Delaware’s statute, like many corporate statutes, permits a 
corporation to loan money to officers and employees, including 
those who are directors of the corporation.309  Loans to officers, or 
to officer-directors, raise a conflict of interest issue and, 
accordingly, courts insist that such transactions be handled in a way 
that complies with the borrower’s duty of loyalty.310  This may be 
done by the borrower proving, if the transaction later is challenged, 
that the loan is “fair” to the company.  Alternatively, the borrower 
may make full disclosure of the material facts  and seek approval of 
the transaction by disinterested and independent directors or 
shareholders.311  Directors approving the loan are required to act in 
good faith and with due care.  Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, by 
flatly forbidding loans to directors and executive officers, supplants 
this aspect of the state law duty of loyalty with respect to directors 
and executive officers.312  Because state law conflicts with the 
federal law prohibition, it is preempted.  State law, however, 
remains applicable for loans to non-executive officers and 
employees. 
As to setting the amount and terms of officer compensation, 
state law confers this responsibility on directors.  State law also 
regulates this—albeit loosely—under fiduciary duty law.  For the 
officer, whether or not she also is a director, compensation raises a 
loyalty issue inasmuch as corporate funds are being transferred to a 
fiduciary.  Directors making the compensation decision are 
required to act in good faith, with due care, and to avoid corporate 
waste,313 a standard thought hard to fail until Chancellor 
Chandler’s recent Disney decision reinvigorated the good faith 
 
 309. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143.  Until the 1970s, most corporate statutes 
restricted or prohibited such loans.  See Jayne W. Bernard, Corporate Loans to 
Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 237 (1988). 
 310. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144; AM. LAW INST., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 at 212 (1992). 
 311. Id.  See also Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL710199, at *11 
(Del. Ch. 2000) (implying that where self-dealing transactions are approved by 
independent, disinterested directors, the business judgment rule is the proper 
standard of review). 
 312. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
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component in the compensation setting.314  Section 304 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley partially preempts both the directors’ role in 
compensation and the applicability of state law fiduciary standards 
for specified compensation of the chief executive officer and the 
chief financial officer, in the event a reporting company prepares 
an accounting restatement as a result of material noncompliance 
with financial reporting requirements due to misconduct.315  Under 
section 304, the officers must reimburse certain compensation.  
The misconduct need not be that of the incumbent officer(s), but 
could be that of a predecessor.  The enforcement mechanism is 
unclear.  The Supreme Court clearly disfavors implied causes of 
action,316 but the statute, by imposing an obligation on these 
officers, may contemplate a correlative right in the corporation to 
sue and collect.  Arguably, state law may include the 
reimbursement obligation within an expanded duty of loyalty 
embracing the gist of section 304, thereby granting the corporation 
a cause of action to collect the money owed.  The problem with this 
conceptual approach is that either or both of the two officers may 
have done nothing wrong.  Consequently, only where an 
incumbent officer has engaged in some misconduct can he or she 
be said to have violated a fiduciary duty.  As to innocent officers, 
section 304 imposes strict liability. 
Sarbanes-Oxley does not regulate or prohibit compensation of 
other officers.  Nor does it regulate or prohibit any compensation 
of the CEO and CFO other than that specified.  Partial preemption 
of state law as to director responsibility for officer compensation 
and as to the remunerative consequences of an accounting 
misstatement is the result. 
In regulating “independent” directors, Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
NYSE and the Nasdaq, consistent with their rules-based approach, 
provide more detailed definitions of “independence” than does the 
state law standard.  State law essentially defines an independent 
director as one who is not under the domination or control of an 
interested party,317 or is not financially or personally “beholden” to 
 
 314. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.  The new NYSE and 
Nasdaq listing standards requiring a stockholder vote on equity compensation 
plans also displace directors as sole decisionmakers on compensation.  See supra 
notes 195-210 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 317. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 355 & n.19 (Del. Ch. 
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an interested party.318  The independence inquiry arises in 
numerous settings, including, for example, in the judicial review of 
a special litigation committee’s handling of derivative litigation,319 
and in the review of a board’s or committee’s approval of a 
transaction with another director.320  A court will more deferentially 
review director decisions in those settings if the majority of acting 
directors are disinterested and “independent.”321 
The more detailed, rules-based definitions adopted by the 
NYSE and Nasdaq certainly govern as to the composition of the 
board itself and the audit, compensation, and nominating/ 
governance committees, about which state law says little.  They do 
not, however, preempt state fiduciary standards of independence.  
Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley only addresses independence of the 
audit committee, not the board itself or any board committees.  
The NYSE rules, moreover, specifically state that they tighten the 
definition of “independent director” for purposes of these 
standards.322  There is no expressed aim to displace state fiduciary 
standards. 
Moreover, the focus of NYSE and Nasdaq definitions is to 
assure that there is no improper relationship of directors to the 
company.  Senior management greatly influences financial 
relationships with the company and, consequently, any director 
with such a material relationship may be influenced by senior 
management.  Delaware’s inquiry pointedly focuses on whether a 
director is independent of the “interested party” who has a conflict.  
One way a director might not be independent is through a direct 
or indirect (such as familial) relationship with the company, but it 
may happen in other ways as well.  For example, a director of a 
company about to engage in a transaction with the director’s best 
friend—whether or not the best friend also is a director—does not 
automatically disqualify the director from being considered 
“independent” under NYSE and Nasdaq rules, because he has no 
 
1998). 
 318. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938-39 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 319. Id.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 320. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 2000 WL710199 (Del. Ch. May 
24, 2000). 
 321. Id.  See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917. 
 322. See also ROBERT TODD LANG et al.,  SPECIAL STUDY ON MARKET STRUCTURE, 
LISTING STANDARDS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1514 (stating 
that governance standards “do not impact the overall preeminence of state 
corporation law”). 
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improper relationship to the company.  The director may not be 
independent under Delaware law, however, which looks at 
“beholdenness” growing out of not only financial but also “personal 
or other relationships” with the interested party.323  State law 
standards that are more fluid on the issue of independence should 
not be considered to be preempted in the fiduciary duty context.  
There simply is no expressed intention for federal law or self-
regulatory organization rules to “occupy the field” in this area, nor 
is it the case that it is impossible to comply with both federal and 
state law on this subject or that state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of federal purposes.  There now is, to be sure, 
dual regulation of directors, but that does not mean, for fiduciary 
duty purposes, that states are foreclosed from applying their own 
standards of independence. 
Nonetheless, to the extent federal, NYSE, and Nasdaq 
definitions are stricter than, or at least as strict as, state law 
standards, directors who satisfy them will satisfy state law 
requirements.  Moreover, those definitions may lead state court 
judges to regard them as highly influential for state fiduciary 
analysis, perhaps even incorporating them—possibly as 
nonexclusive “safe harbors”—into state law understandings of 
“independence.”324 State law is not required to do so, however, and 
state law may consider a director to lack independence even if he 
or she fulfills NYSE and Nasdaq requirements.  Consequently, 
though lacking preemptive force, the new definitions may be 
highly influential for state fiduciary analysis. 
Finally, the Nasdaq proposal that a company’s audit committee 
or other independent board committee must approve all related-
party transactions technically does not preempt the state law duty 
of loyalty governing such transactions325—because a state may 
 
 323. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 938-39.  See Beam ex rel. 
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 984 (Del. Ch. 
2003) (“[W]ith a bit more detail about the ‘relationships,’ ‘friendships,’ and 
‘interconnections’ among Stewart and the other defendants . . . there may have 
been a reasonable doubt as to one or all of the outside directors’ 
disinterestedness, independence, or ability to consider and respond to demand 
free from improper extraneous influences.”). 
 324. Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine also have suggested that 
investors might argue that “Delaware’s common law ought to embrace the 
substance of a feature of the Reforms (e.g., the Reforms’ definition of 
independent director . . .”).  Chandler and Strine, supra note 224, at 986. 
 325. See supra text accompanying notes 211-15, 250.  See also supra text 
accompanying note 124 (discussing Nasdaq Rule 4350(h)). 
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adhere to its own standards for fiduciary duty purposes—but it will 
likely have that practical effect in substantial part.  Currently, under 
Delaware law,326 a director conflict-of-interest transaction may be 
substantially immunized from attack on loyalty grounds either by 
taking, usually in advance, certain procedural safeguards—such as 
making full disclosure of all material facts and obtaining 
independent and disinterested director approval327 or stockholder 
ratification—or by the interested party later proving the entire 
fairness of the transaction to the corporation.  Under the Nasdaq 
rule, pre-approval is mandatory.  If done properly, this procedure 
also will lead to more deferential judicial review for state law 
fiduciary duty purposes.  Specifically, such pre-approved 
transactions with directors will be reviewed under the business 
judgment rule, not the stricter “entire fairness” standard.328  
Nonetheless, if for some reason the mandatory Nasdaq procedures 
were not followed, state fiduciary duty law would still allow the 
director to prove the “fairness” of the transaction to the company 
for purposes of determining compliance with state fiduciary 
standards.  Moreover, the Nasdaq rule only governs “transactions.”  
Consequently, director or officer actions such as usurping a 
corporate opportunity, competing with the company, or 
improperly using corporate assets and information—all of which 
also implicate the duty of loyalty—will continue to be governed, in 
law and practice, only by state law fiduciary standards. 
2.  Duties of Care and Good Faith 
As noted in Part II of this article, Sarbanes-Oxley and SRO 
rules impose certain direct responsibilities on those directors who 
are members of a company’s audit committee329 and mandate 
identification of any financial expert on the audit committee.330  
SEC rules under section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley define “internal 
control over financial reporting” as a process for providing 
“reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting,” requiring such a process to be “effected by the 
registrant’s board of directors” after being designed by the CEO 
 
 326. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2003). 
 327. Cooke v. Oolie, No. Civ. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 
24, 2000). 
 328. Id. 
 329. See supra notes 31-46, 60-76, 114-24 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text. 
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and CFO.331  These new federal responsibilities, and others, may 
influence analysis of the fiduciary duties of care and good faith.  
They may be included within those substantive director functions 
that must be discharged with due care and good faith, under state 
fiduciary duty law.  For example, the new NYSE rules require the 
nominating/governance committee to have a charter that 
addresses that committee’s responsibility, among other matters, to 
“develop and recommend to the board a set of corporate 
governance principles to the corporation; oversee the evaluation of 
the board and management.”332  Those are significant committee 
functions and must be discharged in accordance with state 
fiduciary standards. 
More specifically, the “reasonableness” standard for internal 
controls is a higher standard than that adopted in the common 
reading of Caremark,333 although that opinion is replete with 
references to “reasonableness.”334  The fact that public company 
directors must, as a matter of federal law, adopt “reasonable” 
controls does not necessarily displace the due care fiduciary 
standard of state law.  Nonetheless, faced with a claim that a 
Delaware company failed to comply with the mandates of Sarbanes-
Oxley on internal controls, Delaware courts, especially when 
reminded of the several references to “reasonableness” in Caremark 
itself,335 may be hard-pressed, in the right case, not to draw on 
federal mandates as the applicable state law fiduciary standard in 
the monitoring context.  Essentially, depending on the reading 
given the term “reasonable,” this would amount to a negligence 
standard, though state courts could require greater culpability.  
Moreover, recent case law indicates that deliberate or reckless 
failure in, or indifference toward, discharging director functions in 
this area may be construed as a breach of good faith,336 as would 
any significant deviations from oversight conduct thought essential 
if directors truly were motivated to advance corporate interests, the 
hallmark of good faith.337  As noted in Part III, recent judicial 
 
 331. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra notes 262-73 and accompanying text. 
 337. This is the key point made by Chief Justice Veasey and Vice Chancellor 
Strine in their discussions of good faith.  See supra text and accompanying notes 
252-57. 
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developments and judicial commentary indicate a growing 
sympathy for shareholders’ assertions that director misconduct 
implicates the duty of good faith.338  Consequently, even if courts do 
not modify their due care analysis under the influence of federal 
law, they may regard more egregious director deviations from 
federal and SRO mandates as breaching the duty of good faith.  
Recall too that any knowing director failure to comply with the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley may violate the duty of good 
faith.339  In this way, state fiduciary analysis would be influenced by 
federal initiatives, but not controlled by them.  This is significant 
from a liability perspective as well, because breach of good faith, 
unlike breach of due care, allows a judgment for money damages 
against directors. 
One question that will arise in the monitoring area will be 
whether all directors or only members of the audit committee face 
liability for oversight lapses associated with faulty internal controls.  
Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley places direct statutory 
responsibilities on the audit committee, thereby appearing to 
override statutes such as § 8.25(d) of the Model Business 
Corporation Act,340 which makes the empowerment of committees 
a board function.  That federal section also states, however, that the 
specified responsibilities are reposed in the audit committee “as a 
committee of the board of directors”341 and section 205 defines the 
audit committee as a committee “established by and amongst the 
board of directors.”342  This language appears to be designed to 
honor the state law-ordained board and committee structure.  
Although Delaware does not have such a statute, § 8.25(f) of the 
Model Business Corporation Act makes clear that delegation of 
authority to, or action by, a committee of the board does not alone 
constitute compliance with a director’s duty of care.343  Thus, 
 
 338. See supra notes 252-57, 263-73 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text. 
 340. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.25(d) (1998).  “To the extent specified by the 
board of directors or in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, each committee 
may exercise the powers of the board of directors under section 8.01.”  Id. 
 341. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(m).  See supra text accompanying 
note 33.  See also supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing the SEC adoption 
of rules under section 407 in connection with the financial expert on the audit 
committee). 
 342. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 205, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002). 
 343. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.25(f) (1998).  “The creation of, delegation of 
authority to, or action by a committee does not alone constitute compliance by a 
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directors not on the audit committee—or any of the other 
committees mandated by NYSE and Nasdaq rules—do not satisfy 
their fiduciary duties simply by delegation to that committee.  They 
continue to have state law monitoring and oversight 
responsibilities.  This will continue to be the case even though 
Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, and Nasdaq rules impose certain duties on 
the audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees, 
specifically.  At the same time, both the Model Act and Delaware’s 
statute allow a director to rely on committees of the board of 
directors.344  Thus, provided the good faith and reasonableness 
conditions of those director reliance statutes are met,345 directors 
not on a mandated committee should not face liability for 
misconduct by the mandated committee, as opposed to liability for 
their own misconduct in relation to the activities of the audit and 
other mandated committees. 
As to the liability standard for the audit committee financial 
expert, the SEC adopting release states that it does not 
contemplate greater liability under federal or state law for that 
person.346  Nonetheless, a director having a specialized background, 
qualifications, and responsibilities may find those relevant in any 
judicial assessment of his or her compliance with the duty of care.347  
Moreover, alleged failures by such an expert to act in conformance 
with accepted standards and practices—as these continue to 
develop—may be open to proof by expert witness evidence on 
evolving customs and practices in corporate governance.  Extreme 
departures from such standards of practice (as these develop) may 
also raise a good faith issue.  For the non-experts on the 
committee, as to specialized financial matters they may be able to 
rely on the financial expert under director reliance statutes,348 
although those state law provisions are in some tension with section 
301, which confers responsibility on the committee itself.  Still, the 
language describing the audit committee as a “committee . . . [of] 
 
director with the standards of conduct described in section 8.30.”  Id. 
 344. See Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 
141(e) (2003). 
 345. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra note 132 . 
 347. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 cmt. 2 (2002) (stating “the special 
background, qualifications, and management responsibilities of a particular 
director may be relevant in evaluating that director’s compliance with the 
standard of care”).  This language may apply to members of the audit committee 
and other mandated committees as well. 
 348. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
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the board . . .” suggests a federal intention to honor state law 
governing the committee/board relationship.349 
Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and related rulemaking—
for example, the NYSE and Nasdaq requirements that independent 
directors meet in regularly scheduled sessions350 and that boards 
determine whether a particular director is truly “independent,”351 
and the provision requiring specific codes of ethics and charters—
352 require a great deal of interpretation and judgment by the 
board.  Although disclosure may discharge some of the board’s 
duties in connection with these provisions, generally the board’s 
determinations with respect to such provisions must be done in 
accordance with the requirements of state fiduciary duty law. 
B.  Sarbanes-Oxley and Officer Duties 
Renewed legal and social attention is being focused on senior 
corporate officers.  The Sarbanes-Oxley mandate for more 
“independent” directors, coupled with far-reaching SRO rules on 
independence, will mean fewer corporate officers on corporate 
boards.  Misconduct by such officers will not lend itself to redress 
by invoking director duties.  Only duties attaching to a person in 
his or her distinct capacity as an officer will support a claim.  Much 
of the recent corporate wrongdoing involves senior officers,353 
many of whom—Andrew Fastow at Enron being a notable 
example—were not members of the board.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has brought several administrative 
proceedings against corporate officers,354 and federal and state 
prosecutors have brought criminal charges as well.355  As noted in 
Part II, Sarbanes-Oxley places significant new responsibilities 
directly on senior officers.  Two responsibilities are especially 
 
 349. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 170-204, § 205, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002) (adding Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 3, at § 3(a)(58)) (to 
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c) (defining the audit committee as a committee 
“established by and amongst the board” and providing that if no committee is 
designated, then the entire board serves as the committee). 
 350. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56, 105-106. 
 351. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48, 95-97. 
 352. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 353. Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1 (detailing criminal 
charges and investigations against various corporate officers).  See also Robert W. 
Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance 2002 Style, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 3, 19-34 
(2003) (recounting wrongdoing at several companies). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
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important for fiduciary duty analysis.  First, under SEC rules 
adopted pursuant to section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the CEO and 
CFO must certify quarterly and annual reports.356  The responsible 
officers must certify, among other matters, that internal controls 
have been designed to ensure that material information is made 
known to such officers and that they have evaluated the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal controls.  Second, the CEO 
and CFO, under SEC rules adopted pursuant to section 404, must 
make annual certifications as to their responsibility for establishing, 
maintaining, and evaluating the effectiveness of internal controls 
over financial reporting.357  The controls must provide “reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of the company’s financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements.”358  These 
two provisions, in effect, require the chief executive officer and 
chief financial officer to set up an extensive “reporting up” 
information chain within the company.  Because the CEO and CFO 
cannot possibly review every transaction made by a company, the 
requirements force the chief executive officer and chief financial 
officer to develop a reliable information system and trust that the 
system’s policies and procedures are carried out effectively by their 
subordinates.  This focus on internal affairs was clearly the intent of 
Congress and the SEC.359 
The responsibilities assigned by Sarbanes-Oxley might be 
regarded as building on the state law-ordained governance 
arrangement whereby senior officers are expressly or impliedly 
authorized by boards of directors, via delegation, to manage 
significant aspects of a corporation’s business and affairs, including 
the design and maintenance of its financial reporting and internal 
controls systems.  In this understanding of Sarbanes-Oxley, federal 
law defers to the decisionmaking structure of state corporate law in 
maintaining the central place of the board, while enhancing the 
responsibilities of officers.  Alternatively, Sarbanes-Oxley may be 
thought to remove traditional board responsibility for those 
matters under state law and impose direct federal responsibility on 
senior officers.  The new definition of “internal controls over 
financial reporting” adopted by SEC Rule makes this latter 
interpretation—which would represent a dramatic change in the 
 
 356. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
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basic architecture of corporate governance—less likely by stating 
that responsible officer actions are to be “effected” by the board of 
directors, as well as by management.360 
These new, federally mandated responsibilities are legally 
significant, especially as they emphasize the important role and 
functions of senior officers in corporate governance.  Although 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates new responsibilities, there is no evidence 
of an intention to “federalize” fiduciary duty law.  Moreover, as 
noted earlier, the Supreme Court is extremely unwilling to 
preempt state common law principles or to imply private causes of 
action,361 especially in the corporate law area.362  Consequently, the 
new officer functions mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley have, in effect, 
statutorily increased the scope of managerial responsibilities owed by 
senior officers, but their fiduciary status as agents still exists by 
virtue of state law.363  These enhanced responsibilities must be 
properly discharged by officers as part of the fiduciary obligations 
owed to the corporate principal itself.  Breach of these duties 
creates exposure to the grant of equitable relief and liability for 
resulting monetary losses incurred by the corporation.364  In this 
way, unlike the case under Sarbanes-Oxley, which conferred few 
private causes of action,365 the corporation and stockholders may 
have redress against officers who engage in wrongdoing. 
 
 360. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.  The text of the SEC’s new 
definition includes a footnote reference also making clear the central role of the 
board of directors.  See the Section 404 Release, supra note 161. 
 361. See supra notes 307, 316 and accompanying text.  See also supra note 14 and 
accompanying text (describing the Fair Funds provision of section 308(a)). 
 362. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). 
 363. We reject the thesis recently advanced by Professors Robert Thompson 
and Hillary Sale, supra note 8, that state law says little about the fiduciary duties of 
officers and that Sarbanes-Oxley—not state law—imposes a duty of care on 
officers.  We agree that state law has been surprisingly unclear as to the conceptual 
footing for the officers’ fiduciary duties, see supra notes 291-95 and accompanying 
text, but we disagree that state law does not address officer fiduciary duties 
because, in fact, it does so through well-established agency principles.  See Johnson 
& Millon, supra note 295.    Consequently, state law, not federal law, creates the 
fiduciary status of officers.  Federal law, through Sarbanes-Oxley, increases officer 
responsibilities, which enrich the range of conduct for which officers serve as state 
law fiduciaries for the corporation.  We also disagree with Professor Larry Cata 
Backer’s assertion that federal law “overrides” state law on the duty of care, 
including the exculpation provisions of state statutes like Delaware’s section 
102(b)(7).  These provisions govern directors, not officers.  Backer, supra note 
304, at 938. 
 364. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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Again, although these provisions codify certain obligations and 
activities of the officers, the provisions leave the details—the 
“how”—to the officers.  The manner in which the officers conduct 
the required activities, and the standard by which they will be 
judged as fiduciaries, will largely be supplied by state law. 
As argued in Part III, we believe the whole area of officer 
fiduciary duties lacks a conceptual or doctrinal foundation.  We 
believe that agency law, sensibly applied,366 can provide that 
foundation.367  Also, agency law serves as a coherent way to translate 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandates for corporate officers into fiduciary 
duty nomenclature.  The heightened responsibilities imposed on 
senior officers by Sarbanes-Oxley may best be characterized, in 
traditional terms, as forming part of the agent’s duty of due care.  
The officer certifications required under SEC rules adopted 
pursuant to sections 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley involve “care-
like” monitoring responsibilities.  For example, under section 302, 
certifying officers must state that they are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining internal controls,368 and that the 
controls will “ensure” that material information is made known to 
such officers, among other qualitative matters.369  Evaluation of 
compliance with these standards invites a care-like inquiry. 
The fiduciary duty of care includes a wide range of functions.  
For example, as stated in comment b to § 379 of the Restatement 
(2d) of Agency, in describing an agent’s duty of care: “The 
negligence for which an agent is subject to liability to the principal 
may consist of misconduct in negotiations with third persons, of 
conduct causing harm to the principal’s tangible things in his 
custody, or of conduct causing the principal to be subject to 
liability for a tort, crime, or breach of contract.”370  Clearly, 
Sarbanes-Oxley deliberately broadened the governance functions 
associated with senior officers.  As a result, the range of inquiry for 
determining compliance of these officers with their fiduciary duty 
of care under state law has correspondingly broadened as well. 
Alternatively, the new Sarbanes-Oxley obligations might be 
 
 366. For an argument that agency law principles should be applied to internal 
corporate governance only with discernment and justification, see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 72 
CIN. L. REV. 1187 (2003). 
 367. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 295 . 
 368. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 369. Id. 
 370. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 cmt. b (1958). 
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regarded as part of the agent’s duty to act within authority and to 
obey instructions, particularly given that boards now will likely 
consider officer compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley to be part of an 
officer’s express or implicit management responsibilities.371  
Deliberate or reckless disregard of these responsibilities may also 
constitute a breach of good faith.372  These federal obligations 
might even be considered a component of the agent’s duty of 
loyalty, which demands that officers act for the benefit of their 
principal.373  It benefits a corporation if its senior officers fully and 
properly discharge the obligations mandated by a federal statute 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley.  In short, courts serious about bringing 
fiduciary duty “bite” to the new focus on corporate officers have an 
array of state law theories for doing so. 
Significantly, the standard of care for an agent is usually a 
standard of ordinary care.374  Thus, simple negligence is a breach of 
duty.  This stands in contrast to the looser standard of gross 
negligence for directors, at least in the decisionmaking context.375  
Moreover, the exculpation provisions of Delaware’s 
section 102(b)(7) do not apply to officers, but only to directors.376  
Thus, unlike the case with claims against directors, a due care claim 
against officers may still result in an award of money damages for 
simple negligence.  This, coupled with a 2003 change in Delaware’s 
law to provide for personal jurisdiction over corporate officers377 
and heightened officer responsibilities under Sarbanes-Oxley, may 
lead to renewed attention to the liability of corporate officers in 
their capacity as agents owing fiduciary duties to the corporation.  
Heightened exposure to potential state law liability for officers 
 
 371. Moreover, directors likely have, as part of their expanded duty of care, a 
responsibility to monitor officers’ discharge of officer responsibilities under 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 372. See In re The Walt Disney Co Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 
2003). 
 373. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). 
 374. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958). 
 375. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 376. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  See also Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 
534 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Exculpatory clause in any case would not provide 
protection for officers for any breach of fiduciary duty.”)  Some states, however, do 
include officers within the coverage of their corporate exculpation statutes.  See 
SPARKS & HAMERMESH, supra note 291, at 229 n.90.  In those states not providing 
officer exculpation by statute, officer employment agreements must cover the 
subject, as constrained by agency law’s proscriptions on negating fiduciary duty 
altogether. 
 377. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114. 
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seems consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley’s effort to increase officer 
responsibilities in corporate governance as a matter of federal law.  
It also seems fitting given the central role in corporate affairs 
played by senior officers and given that corporate officers engaged 
in much of the corporate misconduct inspiring Sarbanes-Oxley.378  
Thus, although federal rules now partially regulate officer conduct, 
it will remain the province of state fiduciary duty law to provide to 
the corporation and its stockholders a remedy for officer 
wrongdoing. 
Characterizing the wrongdoing of an officer (or director) as a 
breach of the agent’s state law fiduciary duty also carries 
implications for indemnification.  Indemnification for federal 
securities law wrongdoing is thought to violate public policy,379 
under both the Securities Act of 1933,380 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.381  If officer or director wrongdoing in the 
fiduciary duty context is considered a violation of state lawalbeit 
state law enriched by federal responsibilities—rather than federal 
securities law, the federal prohibition on indemnification falls away. 
Characterizing officer misconduct as a breach of an agent’s 
fiduciary duty carries consequences for lawyers under Sarbanes-
Oxley as well.  Section 307 directs the SEC to promulgate “rules . . . 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys . . . including a rule (1) requiring an attorney to report 
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of 
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent 
thereof . . . .”382  The rules adopted by the SEC on January 29, 2003 
elaborate on this attorney obligation.383  The rules create a duty to 
report evidence of an officer’s, director’s, or agent’s “material 
violation,”384  which is defined to include a material “breach of 
fiduciary duty.”385  This latter term is defined to refer to any breach 
of fiduciary duty recognized under federal or state statute or 
common law.386  In short, lawyers must report “up the corporate 
 
 378. See Executives at Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. 
 379. See Item 510 of Regulation S-K. 
 380. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F. 2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 381. King v. Gibbs, 876 F. 2d 1275, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 382. 15 U.S.C. § 7245. 
 383. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8185, (January 29, 2003). 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
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ladder” evidence of fiduciary duty breaches by corporate directors 
and officers.  State law understanding of officer fiduciary duty is 
somewhat amorphous and undeveloped, as seen in Part III,387 
unless conceptualized as implicating the several fiduciary duties 
associated with agency status.  Understanding senior corporate 
officers as agents means a lawyer—to fulfill his or her 
responsibilities under Sarbanes-Oxley—must “report up” officer 
misconduct amounting to breach of any of the agent’s several 
fiduciary duties.388  Moreover, recalling that lawyers themselves are 
agents—whether serving as employees of the company, such as 
general counsel, or as outside counsel—means they too have 
fiduciary duties, the breach of which, apparently, creates a (self) 
“reporting up” obligation under the new rules. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, Sarbanes-Oxley will have a profound impact on 
officers and directors. As federal law, where Sarbanes-Oxley speaks 
affirmatively, officers and directors, and more importantly federal 
and state courts, must give effect to its provisions. However, as we 
have argued, Sarbanes-Oxley does not explicitly preempt all state-
imposed fiduciary duty concepts, nor are its provisions so far-
reaching as to implicitly preempt such concepts. Rather, Sarbanes-
Oxley contains very targeted provisions that are aimed at certain 
actions of officers and directors and which, in selected areas, 
preempt state fiduciary duty law. Beyond that, compliance with 
many of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley must be interpreted in 
the light of some standard. In those many cases in which Sarbanes-
Oxley does not itself provide the standard, then existing state law 
concepts will almost certainly provide the conceptual framework. 
In other words, state fiduciary duty concepts will need to 




 387. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text. 
 388. See supra notes 281-92 and accompanying text. 
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